1- The Mediation and the parties themselves are too ashamed to make the signed document public which means that, in their own view, the document cannot stand public scrutiny.

2- It is not at all true that the so-called All Stakeholders Conference has endorsed any specific document. The conferees were briefed about the issues negotiated between the parties through PowerPoint highlighting, but nothing like an agreed upon document was presented or approved.

3- The agreement is not comprehensive. Only a very weak party who does not have any known political support or recognizable forces on the ground signed the agreement with GoS. The people of Darfur know very well whether this party is in a position to deliver peace.

4- A major party present in the venue, JEM, was not given the opportunity to negotiate properly with GoS and its efforts in the improvement of the Mediation’s initial documents were not taken into consideration.

5- The agreement failed to properly address the deficiency in fundamental freedoms and human rights in Sudan. There is no mention of a process of abrogation or amendment of the numerous laws that are incompatible with the Interim National Constitution and undermines all sorts of liberties. Equally the fact that the law enforcing agencies in nowadays Sudan are impartial and highly politicised is completely ignored in the agreement. Further, there are no guarantees that a human rights commission that meets the Paris Principles will result from this agreement.

6- The agreement turned out to be a source of great disappointment to the people of Darfur because it failed to realise their major demand of reinstating a united Region of Darfur. The Transitional Regional Authority envisioned in the agreement is no match to the demand of the Darfuris.

7- There is no clear commitment in the agreement to represent Darfur with the post of First Vice President of the country for an interim period. The severity and magnitude of the crisis in the region makes such gesture a necessity.

8- The actual representation of Darfuris in the federal ministerial council is not based on the criterion of population weight stipulated in the agreement. The agreement arbitrarily allotted one additional senior ministerial seat and two posts for state (deputy) ministers while maintaining the status-que. No representation for the Darfuri resistance in the National Parliament or the government of the state of Khartoum where at least one third of the population are Darfuri migrants.

9- The TRA created by the agreement is either a no-authority or a potential source of conflict with the existing state authorities and competencies.

10- There is no clear commitment by the GoS to adequately compensate each and every Darfuri who has been negatively affected by the war. The seed money allotted for compensation is minimal and there are no guarantees that it will be paid timely.

11- The agreement did enormous injustice to the IDPs and refugees when it allotted only $250 for a family to return and resume its normal livelihoods without defining the size of meant family.

12- Amounts allocated for reconstruction and development of Darfur in the agreement are insufficient, arbitrary and without any guarantees of payment. GoS’s record on the payment of such commitments is too bad to reassure any party that its partner (GoS) will honour its word.

13- States and regions should receive more than the 2% earmarked to them from the revenues of oil and other minerals extracted from their soil. This percentage can never compensate the people of these regions and states for depletion of their resources and the damages made to their environment. To add salt to the wound, the agreement completely ignores the urgent need of transparency in the oil and minerals sector.

14- The agreement is very ambiguous about the mechanism that controls and vertically and horizontally allocates public revenues. The country needs a more robust mechanism for physical federalism to confront the chronic marginalization and unbalanced development which is the root cause of all the conflicts in the country.

15- The agreement does not guarantee compensation and return to job to those teachers and health personnel who were compelled to leave their homes and jobs as a result of the war but who kept serving the IDPs and refugees with their respective specialities in the camps.

16- The agreement failed to recognize the ICC as an instrumental actor in bringing the perpetrators of the major crimes committed against the people of Darfur or conceive any practical means to address the issue of justice in relation to the conflict.

17- The agreement left almost every issue of implementation to the goodwill of GoS. Thus there are no reliable guarantees or real mechanisms for implementation of the terms of the agreement.

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