Many of the counter insurgency/pacification/destabilization/anti-democracy Cointelpro style operations used by the government of the United States against foreign governments, particularly Third World governments and used against the Indigenous governments of people of color (such as Cambodia, Chile, Granada, and Iran) have also been used domestically, against American political groups, American communities, and individual American dissenters and organic intellectuals (for a discussion of what an 'organic intellectual' is, so as not to confuse progressive organic intellectuals such as Malcolm X, Angela Davis, and Emma Goldman with bourgeois, so-called 'Leaders," see Antonio Gramsci's book, "Prison Notebooks" at Amazon.com).These practices grew exponentially under Reagan, and had another heyday under Bush II, and will not likely stop due to Obama's election. Such practices have already smoothed the way, by anesthetizing and conditioning public opinion, to our accepting the overturning of at least two US presidential elections, the stacking of our Supreme Court with reactionaries while our news media has been turned into a corporate trust in the hands of Rupert Murdock, and the creation of a terrorized Congress afraid to represent their constituents' interests (the recent revelation that the NSA has been spying upon and bugging the phones and offices of Congress may provide an answer finally to the question, 'why do the Democrats in Congress act so pacified and afraid to act in the name of justice even when they are in the majority??")Why? Perhaps for the same reason that Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Angolan democratic left politicians in the past have found themselves placed under siege politically by the CIA and economically by US corporations such as Dole and The United Fruit Company; perhaps for the same reason that leaders such as Arbenz, Mossedeq, and Allende could get democratically elected in their countries but could not govern effectively and when they refused to play along with entrenched post colonial US interests, could not go on living (see Rein Mullerson's book, "Human Rights Diplomacy" at Amazon.com).For this reason I reprint here recently leaked information from the US Special Forces Army Counterinsurgency Manual. The information contained within it about the techniques of national manipulation used by the US is useful for those who wish to uncover what is happening behind the scenes of our own troubled democracy, presidency, and legislative powers. It makes a good companion to the interview I earlier uploaded of former NSA operative, John Perkins, author of the NY Times bestselling book, "Confessions of a Corporate Hit Man". I also recommend a video by BlacklistPub blogger, RealProgress, entitled, "Black Leaders Under Attack", recently uploaded in the BlacklistPub video section. That video presents numerous examples of the use of manipulative lies and disinformation, and ad hominem attacks on Black public/organic intellectuals and politicians carried out by agents provocateurs, mostly on the United States' PRAVDA style propaganda apparatus, "Fox News".Paz, despues de la luchaProfessor Rayfield A. Waller*************************** ***************************** *****************************Flashback: U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual Leaked, Calls for False Flag Operations, Suspension of Human RightsEditor’s note: Most of the tactics described below are now being implemented and used in the United States against the American people.By Julian AssangeCounterinsurgency tactics now used in Afghanistan and Iraq were first field tested in Vietnam and Latin America.Statism Watch |Wikileaks has released a sensitive 219 page US military counterinsurgency manual. The manual, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces (1994, 2004), may be critically described as “what we learned about running death squads and propping up corrupt government in Latin America and how to apply it to other places”. Its contents are both history defining for Latin America and, given the continued role of US Special Forces in the suppression of insurgencies, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, [this is] history making.The leaked manual, which has been verified with military sources, is the official US Special Forces doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense or FID.FID operations are designed to prop up a “friendly” government facing a popular revolution or guerilla insurgency. FID interventions are often covert or quasi-covert due to the unpopular nature of the governments being supported (”In formulating a realistic policy for the use of advisors, the commander must carefully gauge the psychological climate of the HN [Host Nation] and the United States.”)The manual directly advocates training paramilitaries, pervasive surveillance, censorship, press control and restrictions on labor unions & political parties. It directly advocates warrantless searches, detainment without charge and (under varying circumstances) the suspension of habeas corpus. It directly advocates employing terrorists or prosecuting individuals for terrorism who are not terrorists, running false flag operations and concealing human rights abuses from journalists. And it repeatedly advocates the use of subterfuge and “psychological operations” (propaganda) to make these and other “population & resource control” measures more palatable.The content has been particularly informed by the long United States involvement in El Salvador.In 2005 a number of credible media reports suggested the Pentagon was intensely debating “the Salvador option” for Iraq.. According to the New York Times Magazine:The template for Iraq today is not Vietnam, with which it has often been compared, but El Salvador, where a right-wing government backed by the United States fought a leftist insurgency in a 12-year war beginning in 1980. The cost was high — more than 70,000 people were killed, most of them civilians, in a country with a population of just six million. Most of the killing and torturing was done by the army and the right-wing death squads affiliated with it. According to an Amnesty International report in 2001, violations committed by the army and associated groups included ‘‘extrajudicial executions, other unlawful killings, ‘disappearances’ and torture. . . . Whole villages were targeted by the armed forces and their inhabitants massacred.’’ As part of President Reagan’s policy of supporting anti-Communist forces, hundreds of millions of dollars in United States aid was funneled to the Salvadoran Army, and a team of 55 Special Forces advisers, led for several years by Jim Steele, trained front-line battalions that were accused of significant human rights abuses.From the WikiLeaks site:DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 5 December 2003. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-SFD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.Insurgent Strategies.There are three general strategies of insurgency: foco, mass-oriented, and traditional.Foco Insurgency.A foco (Spanish word meaning focus or focal point) is a single, armed cell that emerges from hidden strongholds in an atmosphere of disintegrating legitimacy. In theory, this cell is the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents build new institutions and establish control on the basis of that support. For a foco insurgency to succeed, government legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is critical. The foco must mature at the same time the government loses legitimacy and before any alternative appears. The most famous foco insurgencies were those led by Castro and Che Guevara. The strategy was quite effective in Cuba because the Batista regime was corrupt and incompetent. The distinguishing characteristics of a foco insurgency are The deliberate avoidance of preparatory organizational work. The rationale is based on the premise that most peasants are intimidated by the authorities and will betray any group that cannot defend itself. The development of rural support as demonstrated by the ability of the foco insurgency to strike against the authorities and survive. The absence of any emphasis on the protracted nature of the conflict.Fidel Castro/CubaIn 1952, Fidel Castro began his revolutionary movement in Cuba. After an unsuccessful attack of Ft. Moncada, he was imprisoned. Upon release in 1955 he fled to Mexico to train a new group of guerrilla warriors. In 1956, Castro and 82 of his followers returned to Cuba on a yacht. Of this group, only 12 of Castro’s followers made their way to the Sierra Maestra mountains. From his remote mountain base, he established a 100to 150-man nucleus. As Castro’s organization grew, small unit patrols began hit-and-run type operations. While Castro continued to expand his area of influence, the popularity of the corrupt Batista government waned. In May of 1958, the government launched an attack on the Sierra Maestra stronghold. Castro withdrew deeper into the mountains, while spreading his message on national reform. Batista’s continuing repression of the country led to general strikes and continuing growth in popular support for Castro’s small cell of revolutionaries. Finally, Batista fled the country on 1 January 1959, and Castro established a junta and became the Prime Minister and President.Mass-Oriented InsurgencyThis insurgency aims to achieve the political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. Mass-oriented insurgencies emphasize creating apolitical and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. They challenge that system and then destroy or supplant it. These insurgents patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas. They also construct a base of active and passive political supporters. They plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside, Their political leadership normally is distinct from their military leadership. Their movement normally establishes a parallel government that openly proclaims its own legitimacy. They have a well-developed ideology and decide on their objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government using propaganda and guerrilla action. The distinguishing characteristics of a mass-oriented insurgency are:Political control by the revolutionary organization, which assures priority of political considerations. Reliance on organized popular support to provide recruits, funds, supplies, and intelligence. Primary areas of activity, especially in early phases, in the remote countryside where the population can be organized and base areas established with little interference from the authorities. Reliance upon guerrilla tactics to carry on the military side of the strategy. These tactics focus on the avoidance of battle, except at times and places of the insurgents choosing, and the employment of stealth and secrecy, ambush, and surprise to overcome the initial imbalance of strength. A phased strategy consisting first of a primarily organizational phase in which the population is prepared for its vital role. In the second phase, armed struggle is launched and the guerrilla force gradually builds up in size and strength, The third phase consists of mobile, more conventional warfare. Conceptually, this third phase is accompanied by a popular uprising that helps overwhelm the regime. It is a concept of protracted war.Vietnam Conflict.The Vietnam conflict (1959-1975) is one example of a mass-oriented insurgency. In December 1960, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, the National Liberation Front was formed in North Vietnam. Its main goal was to establish shadow governments at all levels in South Vietnam to take control of the population from the South Vietnamese. The National Liberation Front also used propaganda and guerrilla action, expecting the South Vietnamese population to rally to their side and overthrow the government. The insurgency was actually a failure because the mass uprising of the population, envisioned by the communist leaders, never occurred. Relentless guerrilla attacks did serve to weaken the government of South Vietnam, but they did not cause it to fall. In the spring of 1975, North Vietnam launched a massive conventional invasion of South Vietnam using armored vehicles. Saigon, the capital city, fell on 30 April.Traditional Insurgency.This insurgency normally grows from very specific grievances and initially has limited aims. It springs from tribal, racial, religious, linguistic, or other similarly identifiable groups. The insurgents perceive that the government has denied the rights and interests of their group and work to establish or restore them. They frequently seek withdrawal from government control through autonomy or semiautonomy. They seldom specifically seek to overthrow the government or control the whole society. They generally respond in kind to government violence. Their use of violence can range from strikes and street demonstrations to terrorism and guerrilla warfare. These insurgencies may cease if the government accedes to the insurgents demands. The concessions the insurgents demand, however, are so great that the government concedes its legitimacy along with them.Huk Rebellion.The Huk rebellion in the Philippines can be considered a traditional insurgency despite its Communist origin. The Huks first surfaced as an armed force resisting the Japanese occupation of the Second World War. After the war, when other resistance bands disarmed, the Huks did not. After the American liberation, the Huks saw a chance to seize national power at a time when the newly proclaimed Philippine Republic was in obvious distress as a result of a monetary crisis, graft in high office, and mounting peasant unrest. By 1950, the Huks had built a force of 12,800 armed guerrillas with thousands of peasant supporters on central Luzon. They were defeated in a series of actions by the Armed Forces of the Philippines led by Ramon Magsaysa. By 1965, they were nearly extinct, down to 75 members. Largely agrarian, the Huks do not view the government as totally in need of replacement but believe that many of the people in it need to be replaced. Recently the Huk movement has been gaining popular support, once again on the island of Luzon.Counterintelligence[...]Most of the counterintelligence measures used will be overt in nature and aimed at protecting installations, units, and information and detecting espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Examples of counterintelligence measures to use are* Background investigations and records checks of persons in sensitive positions and persons whose loyalty may be questionable.* Maintenance of files on organizations, locations, and individuals of counterintelligence interest.* Internal security inspections of installations and units.* Control of civilian movement within government-controlled areas.* Identification systems to minimize the chance of insurgents gaining access to installations or moving freely.* Unannounced searches and raids on suspected meeting places.* Censorship.[...]PSYOP [Psychological Operations] are essential to the success of PRC [Population & Resources Control]. For maximum effectiveness, a strong psychological operations effort is directed toward the families of the insurgents and their popular support base. The PSYOP aspect of the PRC program tries to make the imposition of control more palatable to the people by relating the necessity of controls to their safety and well-being. PSYOP efforts also try to create a favorable national or local government image and counter the effects of the insurgent propaganda effort.Control MeasuresSF [US Special Forces] can advise and assist HN [Host Nation] forces in developing and implementing control measures. Among these measures are the following:* Security Forces. Police and other security forces use PRC [Population & Resources Control] measures to deprive the insurgent of support and to identify and locate members of his infrastructure. Appropriate PSYOP [Psychological Operations] help make these measures more acceptable to the population by explaining their need. The government informs the population that the PRC measures may cause an inconvenience but are necessary due to the actions of the insurgents.* Restrictions. Rights on the legality of detention or imprisonment of personnel (for example, habeas corpus) may be temporarily suspended. This measure must be taken as a last resort, since it may provide the insurgents with an effective propaganda theme. PRC [Population & Resources Control] measures can also include curfews or blackouts, travel restrictions, and restricted residential areas such as protected villages or resettlement areas. Registration and pass systems and control of sensitive items (resources control) and critical supplies such as weapons, food, and fuel are other PRC measures. Checkpoints, searches, roadblocks; surveillance, censorship, and press control; and restriction of activity that applies to selected groups (labor unions, political groups and the like) are further PRC measures.[...]Legal Considerations. All restrictions, controls, and DA measures must be governed by the legality of these methods and their impact on the populace. In countries where government authorities do not have wide latitude in controlling the population, special or emergency legislation must be enacted. This emergency legislation may include a form of martial law permitting government forces to search without warrant, to detain without bringing formal charges, and to execute other similar actions.[...]Psychological OperationsPSYOP can support the mission by discrediting the insurgent forces to neutral groups, creating dissension among the insurgents themselves, and supporting defector programs. Divisive programs create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within the insurgent forces. Also important are national programs to win insurgents over to the government side with offers of amnesty and rewards. Motives for surrendering can range from personal rivalries and bitterness to disillusionment and discouragement. Pressure from the security forces has persuasive power.[...]Intelligence personnel must consider the parameters within which a revolutionary movement operates. Frequently, they establish a centralized intelligence processing center to collect and coordinate the amount of information required to make long-range intelligence estimates. Long-range intelligence focuses on the stable factors existing in an insurgency. For example, various demographic factors (ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, and political characteristics of the area in which the underground movement takes places) are useful in identifying the members of the underground. Information about the underground organization at national, district, and local level is basic in FID [Foreign Internal Defense] and/or IDAD operations. Collection of specific short-range intelligence about the rapidly changing variables of a local situation is critical. Intelligence personnel must gather information on members of the underground, their movements, and their methods. Biographies and photos of suspected underground members, detailed information on their homes, families, education, work history, and associates are important features of short-range intelligence.Destroying its tactical units is not enough to defeat the enemy. The insurgent’s underground cells or infrastructure must be neutralized first because the infrastructure is his main source of tactical intelligence and political control. Eliminating the infrastructure within an area achieves two goals: it ensures the government’s control of the area, and it cuts off the enemy’s main source of intelligence. An intelligence and operations command center (IOCC) is needed at district or province level. This organization becomes the nerve center for operations against the insurgent infrastructure. Information on insurgent infrastructure targets should come from such sources as the national police and other established intelligence nets and agents and individuals (informants).The highly specialized and sensitive nature of clandestine intelligence collection demands specially selected and highly trained agents. Information from clandestine sources is often highly sensitive and requires tight control to protect the source. However, tactical information upon which a combat response can be taken should be passed to the appropriate tactical level.The spotting, assessment, and recruitment of an agent is not a haphazard process regardless of the type agent being sought. During the assessment phase, the case officer determines the individual’s degree of intelligence, access to target, available or necessary cover, and motivation. He initiates the recruitment and coding action only after he determines the individual has the necessary attributes to fulfill the needs.All agents are closely observed and those that are not reliable are relieved. A few well-targeted, reliable agents are better and more economical than a large number of poor ones.A system is needed to evaluate the agents and the information they submit. The maintenance of an agent master dossier (possibly at the SFOD B level) can be useful in evaluating the agent on the value and quality of information he has submitted. The dossier must contain a copy of the agent’s source data report and every intelligence report he submitted.Security forces can induce individuals among the general populace to become informants. Security forces use various motives (civic-mindedness, patriotism, fear, punishment avoidance, gratitude, revenge or jealousy, financial rewards) as persuasive arguments. They use the assurance of protection from reprisal as a major inducement. Security forces must maintain the informant’s anonymity and must conceal the transfer of information from the source to the security agent. The security agent and the informant may prearrange signals to coincide with everyday behavior.Surveillance, the covert observation of persons and places, is a principal method of gaining and confirming intelligence information. Surveillance techniques naturally vary with the requirements of different situations. The basic procedures include mechanical observation (wiretaps or concealed microphones), observation from fixed locations, and physical surveillance of subjects.Whenever a suspect is apprehended during an operation, a hasty interrogation takes place to gain immediate information that could be of tactical value. The most frequently used methods for gathering information (map studies and aerial observation), however, are normally unsuccessful. Most PWs cannot read a map. When they are taken on a visual reconnaissance flight, it is usually their first flight and they cannot associate an aerial view with what they saw on the ground.The most successful interrogation method consists of a map study based on terrain information received from the detainee. The interrogator first asks the detainee what the sun’s direction was when he left the base camp. From this information, he can determine a general direction. The interrogator then asks the detainee how long it took him to walk to the point where he was captured. Judging the terrain and the detainee’s health, the interrogator can determine a general radius in which the base camp can be found (he can use an overlay for this purpose). He then asks the detainee to identify significant terrain features he saw on each day of his journey, (rivers, open areas, hills, rice paddies, swamps). As the detainee speaks and his memory is jogged, the interrogator finds these terrain features on a current map and gradually plots the detainee’s route to finally locate the base camp.If the interrogator is unable to speak the detainee’s language, he interrogates through an interpreter who received a briefing beforehand. A recorder may also assist him. If the interrogator is not familiar with the area, personnel who are familiar with the area brief him before the interrogation and then join the interrogation team. The recorder allows the interrogator a more free-flowing interrogation. The recorder also lets a knowledgeable interpreter elaborate on points the detainee has mentioned without the interrogator interrupting the continuity established during a given sequence. The interpreter can also question certain inaccuracies, keeping pressure on the subject. The interpreter and the interrogator have to be well trained to work as a team. The interpreter has to be familiar with the interrogation procedures. His preinterrogation briefings must include information on the detainee’s health, the circumstances resulting in his detention, and the specific information required. A successful interrogation is contingent upon continuity and a welltrained interpreter. A tape recorder (or a recorder taking notes) enhances continuity by freeing the interrogator from time-consuming administrative tasks.[...]Political Structures. A tightly disciplined party organization, formally structured to parallel the existing government hierarchy, may be found at the center of some insurgent movements. In most instances, this organizational structure will consist of committed organizations at the village, district province, and national levels. Within major divisions and sections of an insurgent military headquarters, totally distinct but parallel command channels exist. There are military chains of command and political channels of control. The party ensures complete domination over the military structure using its own parallel organization. It dominates through a political division in an insurgent military headquarters, a party cell or group in an insurgent military unit, or a political military officer.[...]Special Intelligence-Gathering OperationsAlternative intelligence-gathering techniques and sources, such as doppelganger or pseudo operations, can be tried and used when it is hard to obtain information from the civilian populace. These pseudo units are usually made up of ex-guerrilla and/or security force personnel posing as insurgents. They circulate among the civilian populace and, in some cases, infiltrate guerrilla units to gather information on guerrilla movements and its support infrastructure.Much time and effort must be used to persuade insurgents to switch allegiance and serve with the security forces. Prospective candidates must be properly screened and then given a choice of serving with the HN [Host Nation] security forces or facing prosecution under HN law for terrorist crimes.Government security force units and teams of varying size have been used in infiltration operations against underground and guerrilla forces. They have been especially effective in getting information on underground security and communications systems, the nature and extent of civilian support and underground liaison, underground supply methods, and possible collusion between local government officials and the underground. Before such a unit can be properly trained and disguised, however, much information about the appearance, mannerisms, and security procedures of enemy units must be gathered. Most of this information comes from defectors or reindoctrinated prisoners. Defectors also make excellent instructors and guides for an infiltrating unit. In using a disguised team, the selected men should be trained, oriented, and disguised to look and act like authentic underground or guerrilla units. In addition to acquiring valuable information, the infiltrating units can demoralize the insurgents to the extent that they become overly suspicious and distrustful of their own units.[...]After establishing the cordon and designating a holding area, the screening point or center is established. All civilians in the cordoned area will then pass through the screening center to be classified.National police personnel will complete, if census data does not exist in the police files, a basic registration card and photograph all personnel over the age of 15. They print two copies of each photo- one is pasted to the registration card and the other to the village book (for possible use in later operations and to identify ralliers and informants).The screening element leader ensures the screeners question relatives, friends, neighbors, and other knowledgeable individuals of guerrilla leaders or functionaries operating in the area on their whereabouts, activities, movements, and expected return.The screening area must include areas where police and military intelligence personnel can privately interview selected individuals. The interrogators try to convince the interviewees that their cooperation will not be detected by the other inhabitants. They also discuss, during the interview, the availability of monetary rewards for certain types of information and equipment.[...]Civilian Self-Defense Forces [Paramilitaries, or, especially in an El-Salvador or Colombian civil war context, right wing "death squads"]When a village accepts the CSDF program, the insurgents cannot choose to ignore it. To let the village go unpunished will encourage other villages to accept the government’s CSDF program. The insurgents have no choice; they have to attack the CSDF village to provide a lesson to other villages considering CSDF. In a sense, the psychological effectiveness of the CSDF concept starts by reversing the insurgent strategy of making the government the repressor. It forces the insurgents to cross a critical threshold-that of attacking and killing the very class of people they are supposed to be liberating.To be successful, the CSDF program must have popular support from those directly involved or affected by it. The average peasant is not normally willing to fight to his death for his national government. His national government may have been a succession of corrupt dictators and inefficient bureaucrats. These governments are not the types of institutions that inspire fight-to-the-death emotions in the peasant. The village or town, however, is a different matter. The average peasant will fight much harder for his home and for his village than he ever would for his national government. The CSDF concept directly involves the peasant in the war and makes it a fight for the family and village instead of a fight for some faraway irrelevant government.[...]Members of the CSDF receive no pay for their civil duties. In most instances, however, they derive certain benefits from voluntary service. These benefits can range from priority of hire for CMO projects to a place at the head of ration lines. In El Salvador, CSDF personnel (they were called civil defense there) were given a U.S.-funded life insurance policy with the wife or next of kin as the beneficiary. If a CSDF member died in the line of duty, the widow or next of kin was ceremoniously paid by an HN official. The HN administered the program and a U.S. advisor who maintained accountability of the funds verified the payment. The HN [Host Nation] exercises administrative and visible control.Responsiveness and speedy payment are essential in this process since the widow normally does not have a means of support and the psychological effect of the government assisting her in her time of grief impacts on the entire community. These and other benefits offered by or through the HN government are valuable incentives for recruiting and sustaining the CSDF.[...]The local CSDF members select their leaders and deputy leaders (CSDF groups and teams) in elections organized by the local authorities. In some cases, the HN [Host Nation] appoints a leader who is a specially selected member of the HN security forces trained to carry out this task. Such appointments occurred in El Salvador where the armed forces have established a formal school to train CSDF commanders. Extreme care and close supervision are required to avoid abuses by CSDF leaders.[...]The organization of a CSDF can be similar to that of a combat group. This organization is effective in both rural and urban settings. For example, a basic group, having a strength of 107 members, is broken down into three 35-man elements plus a headquarters element of 2 personnel. Each 35-man element is further broken down into three 1 l-man teams and a headquarters element of 2 personnel. Each team consists of a team leader, an assistant team leader, and three 3-man cells. This organization can be modified to accommodate the number of citizens available to serve.[...]Weapons training for the CSDF personnel is critical. Skill at arms decides the outcome of battle and must be stressed. Of equal importance is the maintenance and care of weapons. CSDF members are taught basic rifle marksmanship with special emphasis on firing from fixed positions and during conditions of limited visibility. Also included in the marksmanship training program are target detection and fire discipline.Training ammunition is usually allocated to the CSDF on the basis of a specified number of rounds for each authorized weapon. A supporting HN government force or an established CSDF logistic source provides the ammunition to support refresher training.[...]Acts of misconduct by HN [Host Nation] personnelAll members of training assistance teams must understand their responsibilities concerning acts of misconduct by HN personnel. Team members receive briefings before deployment on what to do if they encounter or observe such acts. Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions lists prohibited acts by parties to the convention. Such acts are-* Violence to life and person, in particular, murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.* Taking of hostages.* Outrages against personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.* Passing out sentences and carrying out executions without previous judgment by a regularly constituted court that affords all the official guarantees that are recog-nized as indispensable by civilized people.* The provisions in the above paragraph represent a level of conduct that the United States expects each foreign country to observe.If team members encounter prohibited acts they can not stop, they will disengage from the activity, leave the area if possible, and report the incidents immediately to the proper in-country U.S. authorities. The country team will identify proper U.S. authorities during the team’s initial briefing. Team members will not discuss such matters with non-U.S. Government authorities such as journalists and civilian contractors.[...]Most insurgents’ doctrinal and training documents stress the use of pressure-type mines in the more isolated or less populated areas. They prefer using commandtype mines in densely populated areas. These documents stress that when using noncommand-detonated mines, the insurgents use every means to inform the local populace on their location, commensurate with security regulations. In reality, most insurgent groups suffer from various degrees of deficiency in their C2 [Command & Control] systems. Their C2 does not permit them to verify that those elements at the operational level strictly follow directives and orders. In the case of the Frente Farabundo Marti de la Liberation Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador, the individual that emplaces the mine is responsible for its recovery after the engagement. There are problems with this concept. The individual may be killed or the security forces may gain control of the area. Therefore, the recovery of the mine is next to impossible.[...]Homemade antipersonnel mines are used extensively in El Salvador, Guatemala and Malaysia. (Eighty percent of all El Salvadoran armed forces casualties in 1986 were due to mines; in 1987, soldiers wounded by mines and booby traps averaged 50 to 60 per month.) The important point to remember is that any homemade mine is the product of the resources available to the insurgent group. Therefore, no two antipersonnel mines may be the same in their configuration and materials. Insurgent groups depend to a great extent on materials discarded or lost by security forces personnel. The insurgents not only use weapons, ammunition, mines, grenades, and demolitions for their original purpose but also in preparing expedient mines and booby traps.[...]A series of successful minings carried out by the Viet Cong insurgents on the Cua Viet River, Quang Tri Province, demonstrated their resourcefulness in countering minesweeping tactics. Initially, chain-dragging sweeps took place morning and evening. After several successful mining attacks, it was apparent that they laid the mines after the minesweepers passed. Then, the boats using the river formed into convoys and transited the river with minesweepers 914 meters ahead oft he convoy. Nevertheless, boats of the convoy were successfully mined in mid-channel, indicating that the mines were again laid after the minesweeper had passed, possibly by using sampans. Several sampans were observed crossing or otherwise using the channel between the minesweepers and the convoy. The convoys were then organized so that the minesweepers worked immediately ahead of the convoy. One convoy successfully passed. The next convoy had its minesweepers mined and ambushed close to the river banks.[...]Military Advisors[...]Psychologically pressuring the HN [Host Nation] counterpart may sometimes be successful. Forms of psychological pressure may range from the obvious to the subtle. The advisor never applies direct threats, pressure, or intimidation on his counterpart Indirect psychological pressure may be applied by taking an issue up the chain of command to a higher U.S. commander. The U.S. commander can then bring his counterpart to force the subordinate counterpart to comply. Psychological pressure may obtain quick results but may have very negative side effects. The counterpart will feel alienated and possibly hostile if the advisor uses such techniques. Offers of payment in the form of valuables may cause him to become resentful of the obvious control being exerted over him. In short, psychologically pressuring a counterpart is not recommended. Such pressure is used only as a last resort since it may irreparably damage the relationship between the advisor and his counterpartPSYOP [Psychological Operations] Support for Military AdvisorsThe introduction of military advisors requires preparing the populace with which the advisors are going to work. Before advisors enter a country, the HN [Host Nation] government carefully explains their introduction and clearly emphasizes the benefits of their presence to the citizens. It must provide a credible justification to minimize the obvious propaganda benefits the insurgents could derive from this action. The country’s dissenting elements label our actions, no matter how well-intended, an "imperialistic intervention."Once advisors are committed, their activities should be exploited. Their successful integration into the HN [Host Nation] society and their respect for local customs and mores, as well as their involvement with CA [Civil Affairs] projects, are constantly brought to light. In formulating a realistic policy for the use of advisors, the commander must carefully gauge the psychological climate of the HN and the United States.
It's morning. I'm siting at the kitchen next to a window table in my apartment, and its nice and cool, a breeze coming through the window. This is a beautiful apartment--all wood floors (blond, mahogany colors, sealed and highly glosses to a sheen). I like wood, so all my furniture is wood also, and suede of dark brown.color, goes with the wood. Books, books, everywhere. My lady friend, is sitting in the living room under a window with her laptop writing something.
You know, this place is in "Indian Village"--the only two high rise apartment buildings in The Village, historic buildings. I'm in "Tower Two" as the residents call it jokingly--a reference we make to the twin towers in NYC ('the people in tower two were luckier--more of them got out alive') my neighbor across the hall joked one day in the elevator, and everybody just sort of nodded, yep, yep, it's good to be in tower two. I'm amazed at our capacity to process pain through humor; a good thing about us humans).
Ulysses, when I was a child I used to ride the Van Dyke bus past the street this building is on. I used to look up at this tower I'm sitting in now, and think, "wow, some day I wish I could live there with the rich people!"
Putting aside for the moment that back when I was 14 maybe there WERE rich people here, and now the building is full of middle class teachers and city workers and mile managers terrified of the jets striking us all into unemployment hell, there still is the rather startling realization I have sometimes in this apartment that my family (mother, me, my brother, and two sisters, in the poverty period of our lives when my mother and father had broken up and we plunged into abject lack)used to live in the space that is now only one of my bedrooms here. My kitchen is half the size of the whole apartment my family lived in on Belvedere Street in the 70's.
It makes me feel a sense of awe sometimes at the fierce thrust my family made (and all our families made, yours included, I'm betting) to toss us up onto the shore of the bourgeoisie they knew they would never ever achieve no matter how many factories they toiled in, or overtime they shouldered like sides of bloody beef, because WORKING CLASS means JUST THAT: your ass is always WORKING and not for your self, but for some foreman, some shift boss, some assembly line that never stops rolling past you, and your life is measured not in Starbuck's frappes but in hours stamped on your punch card (I went there when I was in my twenties--years as a warehouse worker and truck driver, dreaming about that punch card).
The economic collapse, Ulysses, is sorting our society out in a way: it's reminding everybody that plastic is not money, and that money itself is not property, and that property is heavily taxed by the government. Who's really rich, and who's really poor? Who does the work? Who sleeps untroubled at night because the bills are paid out of a checking account set up just to pay the bills after direct deposit, so that one never even has to look at the bills; all on automatic. No frantic filling out of money orders at this kitchen table where my laptop now clicks (courtesy of Korea, Japan, Malaysia, as you have said, and nobody really got your ultimate point when you said that, I fear).
My father, hard worker and good earner though he was (he put Pauli from "The Sopranos" to shame) who actually came back into our lives after a few years of that grinding poverty, discovered that we were all near death, and made my mother accept him back into our lives to take us off Belvedere Street and move us on up to the East Side--Mount Claire Street! A two story wood and brick house with a big back yard and a 'vestibule'!), my father could afford us Christmas, and birthdays, and ice cream, and summer BBQ's on Belle Isle, and clean sheets, each in a bed of our very own after years sleeping on rat and roach scurried floors. He was a great father. Middle class. Yet, my father not once in twenty years straight, ever had or even imagined taking the time to sit at the kitchen table and write something. And he could have. He was creative, he was ingenious, he was sensitive, and he was inventive: a carpenter, electrician, mechanical engineer, and mason, who showed me when I was ten how the pyramids had been built!
But money he earned aside, bank accounts at NBD aside, and second car in front of the house aside, he drove past this street and looked up at this building too, and said to me, "One day if you want to you'll live up in there with the rich people."
You know the important part is the process of doing, creating, critiquing, improving. Unless you're consuming.
It's always the little twist of truth--of further truth--in what you write that gets me, Man. In a Dryden and Pope world (poets who pronounced 'right' and 'wrong') you, Uly, are a Shakespeare (a poet who asked, 'what IS right and wrong, and how would your children know it if they saw it?'). One reason everybody disregards Shakespeare and pretends that he's unintelligble in the simple inconvenience of his Eliabethan English, is because when you make little effort to figure the anachronistic language out, he's talking about things we seldom want to even admit to ours SELVES, let alone say out loud. Hamlet has a scene with Gertrude in which he figuratively rapes her, in her bedroom, on er bed, wailing about her betrayal of her husband--his father, and he subsequent rejection of him in favor of his uncle Claudius, now his father, her new husband, her former brother-in-law. All of this three hundred years before Freud was born.
In other words, you and me have got to have lunch sometime ("Honest John's near Wayne's campus?). I need to talk with you about many goats, and to chew the fat of many horses; perhaps plan several palace coups, Brother.
I studied for two years with my Sensei, Ron Allen, when he was stil in Detroit, and did some time at the Stillpoint Temple, and so I recognize the Tao when I see it. You, Brother, are Buddhist, whether conscious or not. I left Buddhism because i lacked the patience to adhere to that which I knew to be so (a book cannot be a butterfly, a gun cannot be a flower, a fool cannot be convinced of his own foolishness--the Tao teaches us that we must never attempt to teach the Tao, for the Tao cannot be taught, only understood). I kept being compromised by my desire to seek what is not, and make it so, which of course is contradictory. I was Mahayana, I came to understand, while Ron was Theravada, and student and teacher clashed more and more passionately, until our friendship was threatened. I left the studies rather than shatter that friendship with him, and I went on to thrive, to speak, to write, even to act in the world in favor of what I thought I knew to be right, though always I knew better than to really believe in even my own beliefs. To ACT though, was in me, and I indulged it. Ended up in some very bad places with very bad people as a result, but then that's the result of ACTING rather than meditating. The LIVING Tao was what I wanted to devout myself to. Ron disapproved sharply for my doing this.
Anyway, despite all my prattle and talk on this website I recognize the ultimate meaninglessness of everything that people THINK I am passionately defending or advocating. In reality I am simply proposing and hoping to get feedback I can use to reform my own thoughts! You are so right: seldom does one see metaphor and other figurative language on this site; rather, we see lots of pronouncement and 'witness' here, sunk in a mean sort of temporalism, with no greater openness than the drudgery of simple reportage--the grunt work of describing, summarizing, and paraphrasing that I cannot, try as I might, break my students of when they write under the deformation and dehumanizing effects of advertising, mass media, and the entertainment industry.
I was depressed this morning because appaently I am being censored by the site. When I enter blogs now I get a message saying the blog is being held pending approval of its contents. One has so far not even appeared. My lady friend warned me that on these blog sites, whenever one becomes to critical or analytical, too 'figurative' over and above the simplistic sort of ideological preening, one gets censored. It's happened to her a couple of times at other sites. Now it's looking like its happening to me. I had deeply enjoyed having a voice here, and was contemplating this morning the sadness I feel that perhaps I need to leave this site alone. I've been censored and squelched for years now by newspapers I've written for, by literary magazines, by the universities I've taught at, and even by Marxist, Socialist, and revolutionary organizations I've belonged to, because I assume I am creating the Doctor Zhivago effect: groups and ideologies, countries, and revolutionary cells never like members who believe too strongly in the core values of the group, because such people become a thorn in their sides when it comes time to compromise or to downplay the core values. Nobody likes a true believer.
But your message up above cheered me up. Reminded me, as all your writing reminds me, that none of this ultimately matters much. I can move on if I want, because as much as I love this site, and believe in it, it is not the last, nor is it the best--there is always something better. Or worse, but either way, such is the necessity of existence; that all things, in their essence are both what they are, and in being what they are, create, bring into being, what they are not. Figure and ground.
"You always miss the flight of the crane," I always utter, in despair, to my students when they are being particularly thick headed and stubborn in their smallness or cruelty (one of them said of Cassandra, who must pronounce the future to all around her even though nobody ever listens to her, or takes her seriously, that she is 'a loser' since she 'can't get her message across', so she needs 'a better plan for convincing her target audience'!). They always miss the flight of the crane.
But I suppose, so does the crane, since we cannot see ourselves when we take flight.
It's a puzzle.
All my warmest regards, my Dear Brother Detroiter,
There's little worse than being cold, hungry, wet, scared and gotta piss. Except maybe coming home to feel like you wasted time and ammo.
It's so cool that you don't have to be able to do a lot of the stuff, if you can read the instructions, explain them and recognize the process. Because...
...you have to figure out how to respect people that you once saw as stupid, long enough to make them useful.
You know the important part is the process of doing, creating, critiquing, improving. Unless you're consuming.
You teach it.
You teach what you practice.
You practice, sometimes to the point that you must actively think about what you do automatically.
Think of all those annoyingly, meticulously kept records that institutions use now that use taken from the Nazis. Can you imagine them repeating all that stuff all over, openly? Just to have stuff to play on The History Channel
Man the stuff they (the Moonies, Is that what my folks called them?) own that we just gobble up. 'Ballers' like Rupert Murdock and Fox don't scare me half as much as the Unification Church, simply because most presses buy their info from Reuters, AP or UPI. Anybody will to lose billions in order to maintain control of an information network frightens me.
That Ivo quote is just precious. Remember Magic before all the speech coaching? "Well ahhh Basiclly ahhh".
He needed a justification to learn and practice. Now there are adults that never knew that he spoke like one of the members of "the Junkyard Gang"
Personally, I love Playboy and Conde Naste. They've always got some tidbit of info that cause people to respond to you like you've got spinach in your teeth or a really large booger hanging there when you mention it in passing. But when it hits major news, you become their personal prophet.
Have you noticed the lack of simile and metaphor on this site?
Very little comparison of any type. Just a lot of "Did you see what they did".
You point out the process, by comparing current events to similar past processes
We should be asking what's their next step, more importantly, what's ours.
I like Victory Gardens
By the way, have I shown you Detroit's
new local currency?
Don't think for a moment that I have missed the points you make about growing, killing, and preparing our own food, and noticing who it is that knows, really knows, how to fashion a gas stove from material at hand to cook the food one has killed.
I honestly don't know which is more important at any given moment: the foreground of the painting or the background. I wanna say they are equally important, but that sounds too easy, too much like a professor answer that works in a classroom. I was once in the game, in South Africa nd Mozambique, and yeah, I did indeed notice that even the mortar fire was back seated by those around me who were concerned with keeping their feet dry. After a while, I didn't notice the mortars, but I sure as hell noticed that my feet were wet.
I don't know. It;s a puzzle.
I'm gonna let Kim's son Justin answer that question