goss - Blogs - TheBlackList Pub2024-03-29T09:33:49Zhttps://www.theblacklist.net/profiles/blogs/feed/tag/gossConstitutionalism, The National Question and the Sudanese Civil Warhttps://www.theblacklist.net/profiles/blogs/constitutionalism-the-national2010-12-10T19:14:04.000Z2010-12-10T19:14:04.000ZKWASI Akyeamponghttps://www.theblacklist.net/members/KWASIAkyeampong<div><p><u>By K.K. Prah:</u></p>
<p></p>
<p><b><i>From ?Government and Politics in Africa ? A Reader?</i></b></p>
<p><b><i>Edited by O. Nnoli, published by AAPS Books, Harare, Zimbabwe, in 2000</i></b></p>
<p></p>
<p>An armed struggle has been fought intermittently in the Sudan since August 1955. In Africa its only rival in duration is the Eritrean armed resistance which commenced in September 1961. The early beginnings of the African nationalist insurgency in the Sudan can be traced to the Torit Mutiny August 18, 1955, when members of the equatorial corps garrisoned in Torit revolted against the military authority of the ending Anglo-Egyptian condominium, then officered by Arabist Sudanese. This happened within months of the transfer of state power from the condominium administration into Sudanese hands on January 1, 1956.</p>
<p>After the collapse of the mutiny, armed resistance emerged at various points in the South. Rebel units under Latada and Paul Ali Ghatala operated as separate insurgency groups on both banks of the Nile. Until the early 1980s Paul Ali Ghatala?s unit operated in Western Equatoria. However by 1959, the initial force of the armed resistance had been spent. The fires of armed rebellion seriously rose again in 1963 with the mergence of Anya Nya under the leadership of SANU (Sudan African National Union). Through various turbulent stages of evolution, the war was brought to a major lull by the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. Where most of the African nationalist insurgents led by Joseph Lagu agreed to the peace of Addis Ababa, some elements under Gordon Mourtat Mayne, Paul Ali Ghatala and others rejected the agreement. Paul Ali Ghatala continued the armed struggle, Gordon Mourtat Mayen and Aggrey Jaden remained in exile as political and historical representations of continued rebellion.</p>
<p>With the explosion of the Akobo Incident in 1975 when the integration process of former Anya Nya units into the national army broke down, the fires of war flared up again. The Anya Nya Patriotic Front surfaced out of small beginnings in the Akobo Incident and formed under the political leadership of Gordon Mourtat Mayen until 1981.</p>
<p>While the Addis Ababa Agreement brought for almost 10 years some measure of peace to the South, in hindsight the 1970s appear more as an armistice than a durable peace. The Nimeire regime which ruled over the peace of Addis Ababa increasingly flaunted and rescinded the terms of the agreement and propelled the Sudanese state willy-nilly into the fiery vortex of a full-scale civil war by 1983. The resurgent armed resistance has been led by Dr. John Garang and Joseph Oduhu, a veteran founding member of the Anya Nya in 1963.</p>
<p>Why has the Sudanese conflicts so far eluded substantial peace? This question can be partly understood in terms of the inability of the warring parties to achieve a political and constitutional arrangement which would resolve the contradictions on which the civil war is premised. The dominant feature of these contradictions is the <b>national</b> question in the Sudan; a situation in which an Arab minority controls state power, dominates the armed forces, the civil bureaucracy, the political elite, commerce, trade, banking and the judiciary, and orders these instruments of state power towards a spoken and unspoken policy of Arabization of the African <b>national</b> majority.</p>
<p>Since the end of the Second World War, more specifically since the Juba Conference of 1947, African <b>nationalist</b> opinion has largely defended the idea of a federal arrangement which will recognize the African majority. This has been repeatedly rejected by successive Sudanese regines. The Addis Ababa Agreement gave some room for African <b>national</b> self-expression in the constitutional form of southern regional autonomy but the looseness and fraglity of the constitutional edifice led to a steady erosion of its basis by the Nimeire regime which as time went on increasingly pursued policies of divide and rule, consistent dismantling of the Addis Ababa Agreement, and Arabization.<br /></p>
<h4>The National Question</h4>
<p>Only 39 percent of Sudanese regard themselves as Arab.<sup>1</sup> In spite of this fact, the Sudan is regarded by most international bodies to be part of the Arab World. This oddity is due to the fact that the prevalent character of the Sudanese state is Arabist. The Sudan in national terms in a minority-ruled state. In a crucial political sense this creates comparisons with white-minority-ruled South Africa and Namibia in sub-Saharan Africa, however limited the scope of these comparisons may be. It is ironical that this comparative perspective of South Africa and the Sudan is noted by the former South African white parliamentary opposition leader Van Zijl Slabbert.<sup>2</sup></p>
<p>The Sudanese conflict is often explained as simply a regionalist confrontation. This view is as erroneous as the suggestion that it is largely a religious conflict. While the problem bears both regionalist and religious dimensions, those features of the conflicts belie the more fundamental character of the contradiction which is that the Sudan is largely made up of Africans who are more concentrated in the South where their cultural features are also less Arabized. The southerners have to some degree been Christianized but most lean more profoundly on their traditional African cosmology and ritual. In the North, most of the nationalities have to a great degree been Islamized but again here Africanist beliefs are not uncommon, particularly among the Fur, Fung and Nuba. It is in the North that the African cultural traits have been most diminished and replaced by Arab culture. In many areas of the North, African languages are slowly perishing in the face of Arabizing forces and influences. The Beja, who have historically resisted Arabization, are increasingly being Arabized. The Funj Nuba, Messalit, Zaghawa and Fur, remain largely conscious of their African <b>national</b> identity. However, of all the African nationalities of the North, it is particularly among the Nubian that claims of Arab identity are most rampant. Another irony here is that before the penetration of Arabs in Nubia, this area of the Sudan had been Christianized; from earlier beginnings, by 543-580A.D., Christianity had established pre-eminence over purely African religious practices, and indeed Christianity then became the official religion.<sup>3</sup> As recently as 1742 pockets of Christian communities were reported to exist in Nubia.<sup>4</sup> Although today many Nubians claim Arab nationality, in as much as they have been culturally Arabized, it is noteworthy that structural linguistic similarities exist between the Nubian languages of the Nile Basin, particularly Dongolawi and Mahas, and the languages of the Nuba Mountains, some of the smaller African nationalities of Darfur, and some languages in the South.</p>
<p>As I have indicated elsewhere, essentially it is possible to classify Northern Sudanese who claim Arab nationality into one of two groups. On the one hand, are the Jaali and the Barabra who are mainly Arabized Nubian riverine cultivators, and on the other, the Juhayna who are mainly nomadic groups. Among especially the Jaali, Nubian dialects still survive in the face of increasing Arabization.<sup>5</sup></p>
<p>The dominance of the Arab minority in the Sudanese political economy is practically demonstrated in conditions of extreme underdevelopment in the South and relatively better development in the North. Class variation has tended to run along the crucial national distinctions. This is particularly noticeable among the elites, with African representation singularly weak among the mercantile and banking elements, judicial and military brass. Conversely, Africans are well represented among the ranks of the lowest menial workers in Khartoum and Omdurman.</p>
<p>The need for the dominant groups in Sudanese society to define themselves as differently as possible from African is in some instances reduced to absurdity. For example, as Joseph Oduho explains:</p>
<p><i>?In every passport given to any Sudanese, whether he be brown, semi white, pitch-black, it is always said ?brown? is the colour. And on my passport it is written that I am brown, and probably if I went one day to Nigeria, they will say, brown? This man! It is one of those things ? that you cannot know until you have lived here a long time to know the real difference between the South and the North.?<sup>6</sup></i></p>
<p></p>
<p>The claim of Arabness in the Sudan carries with it, a subjective notion of cultural and national superiority.<sup>7</sup> This situation has tended to encourage Arabization.</p>
<p>Historically, in the collective psyche of the African, perhaps what has crystallized most uniformly in African perceptions of the Arab is the history of slavery. Abdel Rahman Sule, a Southern Moslem who was at the forefront of pro-federalist politics in the 1940s and 1950s, recalls his youth early this century:</p>
<p><i>?My father was a chief, the effendi who came around our village to kill elephants were Muslims. I used to see what these people were doing. That is how I became a Muslim. In 1927, I was caught with arms from Ethiopia, by then I was already a Muslim. But I was very aware of my Africaness. When I was a kid, if I was woken late in the morning by my father, he would say ?if it had been in the days of the Ansars you would have been taken?. My father always woke me up early so that in his words I am not taken by the Ansars.?<sup>8</sup></i></p>
<p></p>
<p>The veteran politician Clement Mboro, whose father was an Ndogo Chief recollects that during the 1930s ?</p>
<p><i>?There were ? Arab traders and peddlers coming around to trade ? The attitude of the people was one of distrust ? That they were not sincere, they were not honest, they were not to be trusted ? they used to sell us the black people, they used to trade in people ? Thus we grew up with the feeling that they were not friendly, not sincere ??<sup>9</sup></i></p>
<p></p>
<p>The inability of post-independence Sudan to meet this history squarely, frankly dispassionately; treat it objectively and openly on all fora of social activity has tended to exacerbate the Sudanese national cleavage. Oduho is caustic in his remark:</p>
<p><i>?Well, people usually are not very happy particularly people from the Northern Sudan, of the mention of the slave trade. And one really cannot understand why this should be so ? All the years I was a school teacher, history was out of the curriculum of the Southern Sudan. It was not allowed to learn history ? when I left the county in 1960, history was not taught. From 1950 to 1960 that entire decade, history was never taught. The history of the Sudan has never been taught in the Southern Sudan. Just to avoid the idea of slavery ? Now they are teaching it, but they skip over it ??<sup>10</sup></i></p>
<p></p>
<p>The effacement of the history of slavery in the Sudan does not only in effect deny the Africans in the South access to knowledge of their national history, but equally this denial debases the history of the northern nationalities. For, as Sir Harold MacMicheal explains, the importation of slave women from the South which has proceeded uninterrupted for centuries, lends further measure to the spurious homogeneity of these Nubian people.<sup>11</sup></p>
<p>The unresolved <b>national</b> question and its class underpinnings can be identified as the fundamental cause of the civil war. The absence of a political arrangement which, while recognizing the majority African <b>national</b> character of the Sudan, affords the Arab minority equal <b>national</b> rights constitutes a recipe for continued war. Every single change of government in the Sudan during the past 30 years has to a different degree been prompted by considerations relating to the <b>national</b> question as expressed in the ?Southern problem?. As Ambrose Ring Thiik observes: ?This war started over 30 years ago because the unrealistic attitudes on the part of the Northern Sudanese who took over from the British, combined with the lack of any national consensus, prevented the working out of constitutional arrangements acceptable to the South?.<sup>12</sup></p>
<p>Thus the African <b>national</b> resistance led by the Sudan People?s Liberation Army/Sudan People?s Liberation Movement (SPLA/SPLM) has come to represent the latest installment of Africans in the Sudan in their quest for self-determination, <b>national</b> liberation, and majority-rule within a constitutional formula for the whole of the Sudan. Since 1983, the civil war has ceased to be confined to the geographical area of the South, and has spread, although weakly, to other predominantly African areas of the North, such as the Southern Kordofan region and the southern Blue Nile area. These developments emphasize the fact that the conflict is not merely regional but rather represents African resistance to Arab minority rule.</p>
<h4>The Consitutional Dilemma</h4>
<p>Present-day Sudan, like all countries on the African continent, is a creation of colonial powers; in this case Britain. Although the condominium arrangement of 1898 stipulated Egyptian partnership, Britain remained to all intents and purposes the very senior partner in the arrangement. Few have expressed British thinking on this matter as succinctly as Lord Cromer. He thought that the facts were plain enough. Fifteen years previously, Egyptian misgovernment had led to a successful rebellion in the Sudan. British rule had developed the military and financial resources of Egypt to such an extent as to justify the adoption of a policy of re-conquest. But England not Egypt had re-conquered the country.</p>
<p>He admitted that it was the Egyptian Treasury which bore the lion?s share of the expeditionary costs. Egyptian troops had been the teaming ranks of the military expedition, but they were commanded and directed by British officers. ?? the guiding had been that of England?. For Cromer, it was absurd to presume that without Britain?s role and assistance in the form of men and money the Egyptian government could have re-conquered the Sudan.<sup>13</sup> However, although in the condominium arrangement England was the unchallenged senior partner, ?it would have been unjust to ignore Egyptian claims in deciding on the future political status of the Sudan?.<sup>14</sup> Herein lay the extent and limits of Egyptian suzerainty and overlordship in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. During the period of condominium rule (1898-1956) many British administrators, particularly those who had experience of the south experience realized that the Sudanese arrangement was a potential powder keg. However, for various reasons of imperial self-interest, the British withdrew without a constitutional dispensation which could have defused the political and constitutional time bomb embedded in the situation.</p>
<p>Realizing the cultural dichotomy between African and Arab Sudan, the British formulated the southern policy in 1930, but long before this the de facto approach had been one of recognizing the difference between the social, economic, and political interest of the areas of high African concentration in the southern end of the country, and the Arabized provinces of the north particularly in the riverine areas north of the 12<sup>0</sup> latitude.</p>
<p>The method favoured by the British to insulate the African South from the Arab North was one of Anglicization and Christianization. In 1903, the condominium government apportioned areas of the region south of the 10<sup>0</sup> latitude to different Christian missions. This arrangement was largely blessed with the 1905 <i>Regulations and Conditions under which Missionaries Work.</i> A 1906 Act gave further financial concessions to the missionaries. African resistance to British domination was relentless and persisted well into the 1930s. Education was seen by Cromer as a crucial method of pacification. It was felt that English would support Christian proselytization. Northern Muslim soldiers became the next target in the strategy of the administrators and missionaries in the South. In 1911 Governor Owen of Mongalla suggested the institution of a new all-African southern army, to replace the northern Sudanese troops. In 1914, the first unit of the new Equatorial Corps was operationalized. In 1914 Sunday replaced Friday as the day of rest in the Lado Enclave. This regulation was implemented in Mongalla Province in 1917. In this latter province in the same year, Governor Owen ?deported? serious Muslims in the area to the North. In the same year the Governor withdrew from all Muslim festivals. In 1922 the condominium administration passed the <i>Passports and Permits Ordinance,</i> together with the <i>Closed Districts Order.</i> This latter law made parts of Northern Kordofan, Kassala, Gezira, Darfur and Equatoria closed districts. On the basis of these ordinances, the South was virtually closed to Northern elements. The 1925 <i>Permits to Trade Order</i> submitted that only natives of the South were allowed to carry on trade in the South without a permit. Further elaborations were made to this order in 1928. Syrian and Greek traders were courted since they represented the Christian religious confession. To reinforce British thinking on administrative practice in general and the insulation of the South from Arabizing influences in particular, the notions of indirect rule as developed by Lugard found fertile experimental and practical ground in the Sudan.</p>
<p>The statutory beginnings of indirect rule in the Sudan can be traced to the Powers of Nomad Sheikh Ordinance of 1922. By 1923, this had ordered and regularized the traditional judicial functions of about 300 sheikhs. In 1927, the Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance further extended the powers and authority recognized and enjoyed by the sheikhs of nomadic ethnicities to the sedentary groups.<sup>15</sup> In the South a meeting of governors in 1922 had sponsored the relegation of local administration ?in the hands of native authorities ? under British supervision?. African ethnic consciousness was encouraged. The 1928 Rejaf Language Conference selected six African languages as media for instruction. As from the same year grants-in-aid were made to missionary schools.<sup>16</sup></p>
<p>Thus, by and large, by the late 1920s a formidable array of ordinances, regulations and arrangements had been instituted which in effect closed the South to (unrestricted) Arabizing influences, and their effect of eroding the African identity of southern Sudan. Peter Woodward is right when he argues that this line of policy associated particularly with MacMichael ?was not a piece of unavoidable pragmatism?.<sup>17</sup> The easier course of action would have been to allow Arabizaiton to seep into the South, under the rationale of pursuing a united and easier Sudanese policy. Such a policy of opportunistic pragmatism would have, as is noted by the then British foreign secretary Arthur Henderson, implied ?a policy which deliberately and of set purpose aimed at encouraging the conversion to Islam of a population who have neither racial nor other affinities with the Moslem Arabs?.<sup>18</sup> There was through the period of condominium rule a distinct lobby within the British administrative cadre which felt that at some future date, the South should be appended on to the British empire in East Africa. This idea never got off the drawing board. Oduho has however argued that in practice the administrative arrangements for the South in effect did not only isolate the South from the North, but also from East Africa.</p>
<p><i>?Well, this idea of isolating the Southern Sudan against the influence of the North ? also ? isolated us against the influences of East Africa. And so, we were left nowhere, really, the people of the Southern Sudan ? Southern Sudanese had nowhere to go ? The Northern Sudan looked on Egypt as Australia or America in the early days looked at Britain. We ? identified ourselves culturally?through traditional religions and so on ??<sup>19</sup></i></p>
<p>Thus in a serious sense, the southern policy, as it has come to be know did not begin in 1930. It had been steadily under construction from the initial years of condominium rule. While the system differentiated the northern people and cultures from the southern, it was in practice not socially hermetic, and not pursued with rigour. Indeed, until the mid-1920s the Baggara were slave-taking in Bahr al Ghazal and selling them in remote markets in the North.<sup>20</sup> It is important to note that the administration and more stringent enforcement of the southern policy was galvanized into motion after the discovery in 1929 that extensive slave trading was still going on from the Beni Shanqul across to the White Nile.<sup>21</sup> It was after this revelation that the authorities decided to enforce more consistently the closed districts legislation and close the South to Northerners, including northern administrators.<sup>22</sup></p>
<p>The Civil Secretary, Sir Harold MacMichael, issued on January 25, 1930 a confidential memorandum to the governors of the southern provinces, in which he summarized the key tenets of government administrative policy in the South.</p>
<p>The policy of the government in southern Sudan was to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with structure and organization, based to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permitted, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs.</p>
<p>Mohammed Omer Beshir?s suggestion that ?its ultimate objective ? the separation of the South from the North ? guided the Sudan government policy until 1945?<sup>23</sup> is superficial and simplistic; more pointedly, that argument confuses the effect with the cause. This ultimately is the reading that can be made into the Governor-General of Sudan?s letter to the British High Commissioner in Cairo in 1945:</p>
<p><i>?It is only be economic and educational development that these people can be quipped to stand up for themselves in the future, whether their lot can be eventually cast with northern Sudan or with East Africa (or partly with each).?<sup>24</sup></i></p>
<p></p>
<p>The southern policy was predicted on the assumption that the South was distinctively and undeniably African. But the primary and self-interested objective was to achieve effective administration through the enlightenment of Lugardian principles of indirect rule. The three decades of armed resistance by the fierce and militant African ethnicities in the South was brought to a close by the Nuer Settlement of 1933. As late as 1938, the Government Secretary?s annual report for the previous year attested to the fact that in ?parts of the territory a risk of local disturbances and outbreaks of violence must always be taken into account?.<sup>25</sup> This was to be avoided.</p>
<p>This administrative policy was welcomed in the South by the administrators, and remained the official guiding formulation on southern policy until after the Second World War.</p>
<p>The 1930s saw the emergence of Northern Sudanese nationalism which was largely independent of active Egyptian influence, and which represented the rise of a middle socio-economic stratum mainly representative of petty-bourgeois interest but with some element of the small but fledgling commercial bourgeoisie. They initially surfaced as literary, cultural, and mutual-aid societies and were predominantly led by the effendis (petty administrators), the educated, and urbanized elites. Appearing first on the political scene in 1931, they made a more mature appearance with British encouragement in 1938 as the Graduates Congress. They represented a new breed, away from the more politically subservient traditional leaders. The Graduates Congress had emerged in direct response to the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. The treaty sought to give Egypt greater manoeuvereability in Sudanese affairs, which had been curbed since the assassination of Sir Lee Stack in 1924, two years after Egypt was granted independence. The Congress broke up when Mahdist and Khatmia sympathizers within the Congress disagreed over policy and objectives. These two streams represented traditional religious affiliation in the North. The Khatmia elements grouped themselves into the Ashiqqa (Brothers) in 1943, the Mahdists formed the Umma<sup>26</sup> party. The working classes in the North largely represented by the railway workers, became increasingly articulate during the mid-1940s. The Sudanese Communist Party as early as 1954 advanced the position of ?autonomy? for the South, however in substance this position by-passed confrontation with the fact that the Sudan was an African country with an Arab <b>national</b> minority.<sup>27</sup></p>
<p>The South throughout this period remained fairly peripheral to the economic and social processes engendered by the penetration of colonial capitalism into northern Sudan.</p>
<p>The British reviewed and abandoned the old southern policy formally in 1946. In his memorandum on Southern Sudan policy of December 16, 1946, the Civil Secretary James Robertson restated the new formula to read amongst other points that: ?? the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the Middle-Eastern and arabicised Northern Sudan.?<sup>28</sup></p>
<p>In order to meet and contain anti-colonial nationalist consciousness in the North and in accordance with the advice of Stafford Cripps to Douglas Newbold ?Not to wait upon events,?<sup>29</sup> an Advisory Council was created in 1944. The central question in the politics of the North after 1945 was the issue of the eventuality of political independence, and what shape or form this might take. On these matters the two dominant streams of North Sudanese politics, the NUP (Khatimia), and the Umma (Mahdist) and their predecessors reflected opposing viewpoints. While the NUP supported an arrangement of Sudanese-Egyptian federation in line with their old and much vaunted notion of ?unity of the Nile Valley?, the Mahdist grouping favoured independence with some measure of Commonwealth or British linkage. Most of the co-operation for both the Advisory Council and the later Legislative Assembly of 1948 derived from the Mahdist elements. However, the success of the 1952 coup in Egypt created a favourable political atmosphere for the NUP. The threat of prejudicing their imperial prospects in Egypt, the Middle East, and the empire east of Suez demanded remaining in collaborative terms with the Egyptians and their political sympathizers in the Sudan. American influence in British Middle East politics was not insignificant.</p>
<p>The October 1946 agreement (the Sidqui-Bevin Protocol) reached between the British and Egyptians undertook ?to follow in the Sudan, within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common crown of Egypt?. It represented an attempt to buy the favour of Egypt by ?selling the Sudan to Egypt?.<sup>30</sup> While Southern opinion on these events and later ones was not invited, the Umma-supported demonstrations in the North helped to swiftly dampen British support for the terms of the Protocol. During mid-1947, the issue was taken to the UN Security Council where it fell like a damp squid. The Sudanese were generally marginalized in these discussions. Although by and large the Northern Sudanese had some platforms and institutional forms for political expression, in the South there were neither the platforms nor the cadre of educated voices to articulate their interests. The Juba Conference of June 1947 saw the initiation of the constitutional debates in the Sudan which have so far failed to produce a constitutional structure capable of containing the conflicting interests in Sudanese society. The principal architect of the conference, James Robertson, has written that:</p>
<p><i>?I thought that before advising the Governor-General in Council about this matter I ought to satisfy myself about the capacity of the Southerners to sit in a Legislative Assembly and play a constructive part in the discussions and deliberations ? I looked upon the conference solely as a means of finding out the capabilities of the Southerners, and it was therefore quite inaccurate for some people to say later that at the Juba Conference the Southern representatives agreed to come in with the North ? the only decision resulting from the conference was taken by myself. I decided that I could, after what I had seen of the Southerners who attended, endorse the recommendation of the Administrative conference, and ask the Governor-General ? in-Council to accept its proposal that the new Legislative Assembly should be representative of the whole Sudan.?<sup>31</sup></i></p>
<p>It has been suggested that ?the change of attitude of certain educated Southerners who had first spoken against any participation in the Legislative Assembly and later changed their minds, was due to the efforts of Mohamed Saleh Eff Shingeiti, a Northern member of the Conference?.<sup>32</sup> This view is corroborated by Sir James Robertson, who writes that:</p>
<p><i>?I guessed at the time that my friend Mohamed Shingeiti, one of the Northern Representatives I took with me, had been busy during the night persuading the Southern Officials that Northern rates of pay would surely come to the South, if they agreed to come in with the North. This apparently persuaded Clement Mboro and others ??<sup>33</sup></i></p>
<p></p>
<p>Sir James Robertson?s guess was apparently wrong. Clement Mboro who was the most articulate of the educated southerners at the Conference bears a different testimony. He recollects that in the minds of most of the southern intelligentsia who took part in the Juba Conference it was clear that the best course of action was to throw in their lot with the North, and join whatever constitutional arrangement could be reached on the basis of the unity of the Sudan. This was quite well understood by all to be the declared course of action since 1946. Again most of the intelligentsia were of the view that separate constitutional arrangements for the South within the unity of the Sudan was undesirable. The only prominent dissenting view on this was Hassan Fertak, who felt that separate constitutional measures within one Sudan were necessary. Most of the chiefs were of a different view. Their position was that age and experience had taught them that it would be injudicious to go it together with the North. Separation was a better option. In the event, the views of the intelligentsia prevailed. Mboro remarks that they never met Shingeiti except in the conference room.<sup>34</sup></p>
<p><i>?The one who attempted to influence us was Ibrahim Badri. He happened to have worked for many years in Bahr el Ghazel. He happened to know me, to know my father. I remember him, myself and Stanislau Paysame sitting, he pressed my hand, he said, ?My son, the best thing for you is to opt out of this thing with the North ? the Sudan is already united ? but for your constitutional development, you had better have your own local arrangement here. Have your own local council, your own local autonomy, but not to join in with the North straight? ??<sup>35</sup></i></p>
<p>The Advisory Council was promulgated under the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan Order of 1943. This Council presided over by the Governor-General and deputized by the Civil Secretary met eight times from 1945 and was annulled in 1948.</p>
<p>The scheduling of the Juba Conference was one of the principal decisions reached at the Sudan Administrative Conference of April 22, 1946. The other concrete decision taken was with regards to the need and composition of a new Legislative Assembly to replace the Advisory Council. A British draft for the legistlature was in some details objected to by the Egyptians particularly with regard to the marginalization of the Egyptian role. These objections were largely overruled by the eventual Executive Council and Legislative Assembly Ordinance. This ordinance created a 12 to 18 member Executive Council, 50 percent of whom had to be Sudanese. The Legislative Assembly was structured to have 10 nominated members, 52 northerners and 13 southerners. Work on government legislation was shared between the institutions of the Executive Council and the Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Assembly which first met on December 15, 1948 under Abdalla Bey Khalil saw the formal incorporation of southern opinion into the developing constitutional dispensation for the Sudan prior to the attainment of the status of independence.</p>
<p>While political debate in the North was preoccupied with the formula for independence with regard to the degree of merger, co-operation with or independence from Egypt, Southern politicians were most concerned with ideas for the sort of federal structure for an independent Sudan which would protect the economic, cultural, and national interests of the Africans in the South.</p>
<p>US anxiety matched by pressure on the British government to conclude an understanding with the Egyptian regime which would protect western interests in the Middle East in general, and the Suez Canal in particular only served to raise Sudanese fears, mainly within the Umma, that Britain might sell the Sudan for a bargain with Egypt. Thus when the Egyptian monarch announced in the Egyptian parliament that the 1899 and 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaties were to be withdrawn, the Umma-dominated Legislative Assembly went ahead and passed a resolution demanding self government in 1951. Ensuing discussions resulted in the creation of a constitutional Amendment Commission to propose constitutional changes. This Commissions started its work on March 29, 1951. The new, pro-Egyptian unionist political party, the National Front, the unionist Ashiqqa, and Khatmia under Ali el Mirghani, supported a position of independence under the Egyptian crown rather than outright merger, and all boycotted the Constitutional Amendment Commission, as they had done with the Legislative Assembly and the Advisory Councils.<sup>36</sup></p>
<p>When the Egyptian government on October 8, 1951 abrogated the 1899 and 1936 agreements and enunciated a constitution for the Sudan, it was rejected by all shades of political opinion in the Sudan except the Ashiqqa.<sup>37</sup> The British rejected the Egyptian constitution and ultimately prepared a report which served as a draft for the Self-Government Statute, adopted by the Legislative Assembly on April 23, 1952. The British Government endorsed the draft statute in October of the same year.<sup>38</sup></p>
<p>In July 1952, King Farouk was overthrown, Gen. Neguib?s new administration entered into negotiation with the Umma and reached agreement calling for self-determination for the Sudan preceded by a period of transitional government. All the northern Sudanese parties signed an agreement with the Egyptians on January 10, 1953 endorsing the Egyptian proposals. The British outflanked these developments with an Anglo-Egyptian agreement signed on February 12, 1953. The transitional period to self determination was not to exceed 3 years. The negotiations for the Anglo-Egyptian agreement excluded southern participation on the grounds that the South had no political parties. This show of disregard for southern opinion whatever the formal explanation offered was regarded with great suspicion by southern leadership. Benjamin Lwoki, a prominent southern leader later complained that: ?Southerners were not happy when the 1953 Agreement was signed. None were present. The Legislative Assembly was dead ? telegrams of protest had been ignored. The terms of the Agreement had not been carried out.?<sup>39</sup></p>
<p>One of the results of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement was that a Governor-General?s Commission was set up to assist the country in its transition to independence. This body did not include southern opinion. A Sudanization Committee was formed in February 1954 to localize administrative posts in the civil service. Of about 800 posts which were Sudanized, only four southerners were made Assistant District Commissioners and two Mamurs (Executive Officer). These developments did not help to allay southern fears regarding the intentions of the North. In 1951, a group of southerners had formed a political caucus; this became the Southern Party in 1953.</p>
<p>In the elections of November-December 1953, the NUP won a majority, and political moves towards independence continued amidst attempts to woo the South.</p>
<p>By the beginning of the 1950s, southern political awareness and militancy was on the upsurge. An older group of educated southerners who had been operating since 1947 as the Southern Sudan Intelligentsia Committee, evolved in 1954 into the Liberal Party incorporating and inheriting the mantle of the Southern Party. This group found a more sympathetic ear among the Umma than the NUP. The Liberal Party at this stage carried the bulk of enlightened southern opinion. A conference of the Liberal Party was organized in October 1954, in Juba. There was widespread criticism of the Sudanization process. More importantly the delegates agreed almost unanimously that a federal constitutional status with the North should be accorded South. When a tour of the South was undertaken by NUP politicians led by the Prime Minister Al Azhari, they received a frosty reception. When the government raised the salaries of police, prison officers and some bureaucrats to match northern scales, they left out the Article III clerical category to which class most of the petty southern intelligentisia belonged. In mid-1955, the Liberal Party issued a call for all southerners regardless of party affiliations to form a ?southern block? to pursue the objective of Southerners, particularly a federal constitution.<sup>40</sup></p>
<p>The general southern position during this period favoured a federal constitution, although there was a small group of Southerners which remained unhappy about any linkage with the North and preferred outright separation. The political atmosphere was charged. When 300 southern workers in June and July were dismissed en masse from the Zande Scheme in Western Equatoria tensions mounted. On July 25, a Southern M.P., Elia Kuze was imprisoned after an unsatisfactory trial. On the 26<sup>th</sup>, a demonstration took place in the industrial town of Nzara. Six Azande were killed and many others were wounded. From then on events moved swiftly to a violent climax.</p>
<p>The Torit Mutiny of August 18, 1955, was the ringing historical testimony that the African people of the Sudan were on the brink of war against the emergent Arabist-minority state. The constitutional demand of southerners had previously been largely a call for a federal status, but in the ensuing years the southern viewpoint increasingly hardened. So that, by the time the exodus of December 1960 took place, when southern leaders like Saturnina Lohure, Ferdinand Adiang, William Deng, Joseph Oduha, Alexis Bakuma and others crossed the border into Uganda and the Congo, the view that it was impossible to coexist with the northern elite in a unified state was gaining currency, and separation or secession was beginning to be seriously favoured by the more militant sections of African leadership. Barely three years after the exodus of 1960, the Anya Nya was formed.</p>
<p>When in December 1955 parliament sought a unanimous vote for independence, they failed mainly because the southern representation was apprehensive and skeptical of northern post independence intentions. As Deng Awur Wenyin has argued: ?? the Southerners stood in the way, because they thought (and rightly) that if the situation was like that for them while the colonizers (Britain and Egypt) were still here, how would it look after they left.?<sup>41</sup> Vague promises to consider Southern demands were made by northern politicians.</p>
<p>The Sudan became independent on the January 1, 1956 under the constitutional terms of the Transitional Constitution, 1956. Two years later, elections were held for a new Constituent Assembly which was opened with election procedures for a Prime Minister. The Liberal Party fielded Stanislau Paysama against Abdalla Bey Khalil (Umma) and Ishamil Al Azhari (NUP), knowing well they could not win, but anxious to show that the independent will of the political South would not falter. The primary object of the Constituent Assembly was to prepare a permanent constitution for the Sudan ? when the draft constitution was drawn up and presented to parliament, it disregarded the demand for federation. The southern parliamentarians walked out during the debate. The terminal statement prior to departure of the Southern leadership is significant. It drew attention to: ?The South claims to federate with the North, the right that the South undoubtedly posseses as a consequence of the principle of free self-determination which reason and democracy grant to a free people.?<sup>42</sup></p>
<p>Even more significantly, parliamentarians and notables from other predominantly African areas of northern Sudan, specifically the Beja nationalities of the northeast and representatives from Darfur and Kordofan subsequently advanced similar demands for federal status.<sup>43</sup> These developments were regarded as ominous signs and induced the narrow riverine Arabist elite, led by the Prime Minister, to arrange a military takeover. The Abboud regime ruthlessly pursued a policy of Arabization in the South.</p>
<p>The nationalist resistance of the Anya Nya grew with time but was weakened by excessive factionalism, leadership squabbles, regionalism and the absence of a consistent and coherent ideology of national liberation. Thus by 1967, warlordism was emergent, and tactics often tended to alienate the rural masses who formed the main support base.</p>
<p>The collapse of the Abboud regime in October 1964 was a direct consequence of the failure of the regime to bring forward viable solutions. In 1965, the escalating chaos prompted the convention of a round-table conference with the African <b>nationalist</b> insurgents, but this failed to open the way substantially for moves to bring the expanding insurgency to an end. Rather, throughout this period the articulation of arguments for an Islamic state developed increasing stridency. These trends were keenly opposed by the Southern Front and the Sudan African National Union (SANU). However the telling and more decisive opposition to theocratic constitutionalism was the fledgling bush war. As one regime after the other moved centre-stage with no ability to resolve the ?southern problem? the Free Officers Movement under Nimeire seized power on May 25, 1969. The June 9, Declaration recognized the cultural diversity of the country and this led the way to the Addis Ababa Agreement of March 27, 1972. While the agreement gave regional autonomy to the South, it addressed the problem in largely regionalist terms. Questions of religion, culture and <b>nationality</b> were given scant attention. Nimeire forged the Sudan Socialist Union as an instrument of civil rule and political machinery in the absence of political parties. In 1973, elections were held for the first People?s National Assembly. Its function was to propose a permanent constitution. The resulting constitution, while conceding regional autonomy, placed Islam centrally in the state and adopted Islamic law and custom as the main sources of legislation.</p>
<p>Within 10 yeats, the Nimeire regime made a full circle. Piece by piece the Nimeire regime dismantled the basis and structure of regional autonomy for the South. Throughout the 1970s the Nimeire government made an adept use of the principle of divide and rule in the South, exploiting for this purpose latent ethnic and regionalist feelings of people caught up in the holism of their largely precapitalist social world. The main focus of such strife and division, which was keenly exploited by the Nimeire regime, was the rivalry between the people of the Upper Nile and Bahr al Ghazal on the one hand and equatorians on the other. One key factor making the southerners particularly susceptible to the politics of divide and rule was the class character of southern leadership. Consisting largely of petty bureaucratic elements, they relied on government appointments and favours in order to maintain their socioeconomic status. Indeed, much of the redivision campaign can be understood in terms of the expansion of this class, competition for positions, and the expansion of state bureaucratic positions which redivision implicity promised. Above all, redivision of the South in June 1983 represented an open contradiction to the Addis Ababa Agreement, and the Southern Regional Self-Government Act of 1972.</p>
<p>The implementation of the Jonglei Canal Scheme to bring water to Egypt and drain the Sudd was taken up without proper political consensus in the South, and against informed ecological advice. Equally opportunistic was the project for the Kosti oil refinery which attempted to situate the refining of oil found in the South out of the region, and then pipe it out through the Red Sea coast at Port Sudan.</p>
<p>In 1980, some of the northern parliamentarians in concert with the government redrew the boundaries between the North and the South in order to bring key areas of Gogrial district in the Bahr el Ghazal and the oil-rich areas of Lakes Province, the Renk area, into the North. Despite a protest walkout by southern members of the National Assembly the new map was endorsed.</p>
<p>The imposition of Sharia Law in September 1983 was the most dramatic arbitrary act by the Nimeire regime against the rights of the non-Muslim Africans of the Sudan. However by then the systematic attack on all agreements and understandings regarding southern autonomy had already triggered off increased armed rebellion, and the SPLA/SPLM emerged to lead African <b>national</b> resistance.</p>
<h4>Conclusion</h4>
<p>The contradictions of Sudanese society which have for three decades kept the fires of war burning, arise out of the fact that the sharp class struggles run, as it were, parallel to the national and cultural cleavages within the society. The overwhelming proportion of the African people of the Sudan are concentrated in the lower ranks of the class structure. The small group of elevated Africans are of the bureaucratic bourgeois element and in general lack the capital and resources to develop along independent social lines.</p>
<p>The partial convergence of the national and class struggles premised a situation of uneven development between the North and the South. The ideological apparatus of rule of the dominant classes in the Sudan consists of the twin pillars of Islamization and more importantly Arabization. More than anything it is this latter which expresses the subjugation of the African masses within the class structure, and continues to constitute the focal point of the African <b>nationalist</b> struggle against Arab-minority rule. Unless there is a constitutional dispensation which recognizes the fundamental and overwhelming African character of the Sudan, and which recognizes equal rights for the Arab minority, it is unlikely that durable peace can be achieved in the Sudan. The experience of the past three decades bears testimony to this contention.</p>
<h4>Notes</h4>
<p>1. According to the 1958 Census Results.</p>
<p>2. Van Zyl Slabbert, (1985) <i>The Last White Parliament.</i> Johannesburg, p. 92. Van Zyl Slabbert was discussing the work of the German social scientist Theo Hanf.</p>
<p>3. See Giovanni Vantini, (1981), <i>Christianity in the Sudan,</i> p. 33, Bologna.</p>
<p>4. Giovanni Vantini, <i>ibid.</i> p. 205.</p>
<p>5. ?African Nationalist and the Origins of War in the Sudan?, <i>Lesotho Law Journal,</i> Vol. 2, No. 2. 1986.</p>
<p>6. Interview, Joseph Oduho, August 19, (1982), Juba.</p>
<p>7. Joseph Oduho, <i>ibid.</i></p>
<p>8. Interview, Abdel Rahman Sule, June 7, (1983), Juba.</p>
<p>9. Interview, Clement Mboro, August 17, (1983), Nairobi.</p>
<p>10. Interview, Joseph Oduho, <i>op cit.</i></p>
<p>11. H.A. MacMichael, (1922), <i>A History of the Arabs in the Sudan,</i> p. 113, Cambridge.</p>
<p>12. A.R. Thiik, (1985), ?Political and Constitutional Crisis in the Sudan?, <i>Sudan Today,</i> London.</p>
<p>13. The Earl of Cromer, (1908), <i>Modern Egypt.</i> Vol. 2. London, p. 112.</p>
<p>14. The Earl of Cromer, <i>ibid.</i> p. 113.</p>
<p>15. P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, (1970), <i>The History of the Sudan</i> (3<sup>rd</sup> edition), pp. 136-137, London.</p>
<p>16. P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, <i>ibid.</i></p>
<p>17. Peter Woodward, (1979), <i>Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism,</i> p. 11, London.</p>
<p>18. Letter of Lloyd to Arthur Henderson, June 19, (1929), quoted here from Peter Woodward, <i>ibid.</i></p>
<p>19. Interview Joseph Oduho, <i>op cit.</i></p>
<p>20. K.D. Henderson, (1965), <i>Sudan Republic,</i> p. 162, New York.</p>
<p>21. K.D. Henderson, <i>ibid.</i> p. 164.</p>
<p>22. K.D. Henderson, <i>ibid.</i></p>
<p>23. M.O. Beshir, (1979), <i>The Southern Sudan. Background to Conflict,</i> p. 59, Khartoum.</p>
<p>24. Quoted here from M.O. Beshir, <i>ibid.</i></p>
<p>25. Report on the Administration, Finances and Condition of the Sudan in 1937.</p>
<p>26. Meaning ?Nation?. Umma party is the political face of the Ansar Sect.</p>
<p>27. It is significant that in substance, the rationalizations of the Sudanese Communist Party do not differ from the 1928 formulation on the national question in South Africa as understood by Sidney Bunting.</p>
<p>28. James Robertson, (1974), Transition in Africa, London.</p>
<p>29. Peter Woodward, <i>op cit.,</i> p. 33.</p>
<p>30. James Robertson, <i>op cit.,</i> p. 96.</p>
<p>31. James Roberston, <i>op cit.</i> p. 107.</p>
<p>32. M.O. Beshir, The Southern Sudan, <i>op cit.,</i> p. 66. The author indicates the source to be a letter from the Governor, Bahr al Ghazal, to District Commissioners, September 23, 1947, Sudan Government Archives.</p>
<p>33. James Robertson, <i>op cit.,</i> p. 108.</p>
<p>34. Interview, Clement Mboro, August 17, (1983), Nairobi.</p>
<p>35. Interview, Clement Mboro, <i>Ibid.</i></p>
<p>36. See P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, <i>op cit.,</i> 154-155.</p>
<p>37. Muddathir Abd Al Rahim, 1969, <i>Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan,</i> p. 192, Oxford.</p>
<p>38. P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, <i>op cit.,</i> p. 155.</p>
<p>39. Report of the Commission on Enquiry into the Southern Sudan Disturbances of August, 1955.</p>
<p>40. Deng Awur Wenyin, (1985), <i>The Southern Sudan and the Making of a Permanent Constitution in the Sudan, mimeo,</i> Khartoum.</p>
<p>41. Quoted here from A.R. Thiik, (1985), ?Political and Constitutional Crisis in the Sudan?, <i>Sudan Today,</i> p. 15, London.</p>
<p>42. R.A. Thiik, <i>Ibid.</i></p>
<p>43. R.A. Thiik, <i>Ibid.</i></p>
<p></p>
<p><em>SOURCE:<br /></em><em>B.F.Bankie<br /></em><em>Sudan Sensitisation Project (SSP)<br /></em><a href="http://www.bankie.info" target="_blank"><em>www.bankie.info</em></a></p>
<div class="wlWriterHeaderFooter" style="margin:0px;padding:0px 0px 0px 0px;"><br /><br /></div></div>DECLARE South Sudan Independence Now!https://www.theblacklist.net/profiles/blogs/declare-south-sudan2009-04-14T15:21:15.000Z2009-04-14T15:21:15.000ZBF Bankiehttps://www.theblacklist.net/members/BFBankie<div><b>Anyar Ngang Alith:</b>I have been contemplating about writing this topic for a long time. But something keeps me from writing it. One of the days I went to bed at 12:00 midnight and I dreamt in my sleep that South Sudan had declared unilateral independence, and it had been recognized by a dozen nations in the region and internationally.So when I awoke there was no such news, and I guess my brain was screwed.Now what? I would get into my favourite subject of all subjects in the world of politics today (South Sudan independence). Though politic is not where I am good at, I would try my best to put my ideas into intellectual perspective.Nowadays if you listen to news coming out of Southern Sudan, and you do really care about that land, you feel depressed and demoralized. There South Sudan has the right to self declare Unilateral Independence and they haven't been able to do so.If you have been listening to news coming out of South Sudan, it's depressing and demoralizing. There is tribal feud all over South nagging on every issue that arises.For me, that is a bad taste. I would want a government which is tough and decisive on issues coming out of post war Sudan. In Southern Sudan today, anybody can do anything they want and they know they will get away with it. Why? Because there is no rule of law. Government is there nominally. They are not doing anything per se. You are stabbed in the back several times, slapped in the face 4 times and and nothing is done about it, until the daywhen you fall and collapse.Have I bored you? OK I promise I'll be done here. Here is what I want; GOSS should declare the independence of South Sudan now. Why am I advocating on this subject only?It is because I want South Sudan to stand on its own feet without support from a third party. Today South Sudan can be pushed down from its unstable feet by the Sudan government. If we declare unilateral independence today, we will have a lot of benefits and solve our own problems too.<b>The benefits of unilateral independence are:</b><i>Stable South SudanIndependent economyFreedom from oppressionConstitutional right </i><b>However, there would be problems that we would have to tackle, for instance:</b><i>Tribal feudsCorruptionLack of qualified civil servant</i>Yet, all of the above problems would need tackling from day one of independence but am not worried about them, because we are already dealing with them. As long we get the benefits above, then am not going to spend my time worrying about them because we can solve them without interference from a third party (Sudan Government).In addition, the Government of Sudan today is at it weakest point in their 20 years of mismanagement and genocidal war against the south. Today they are cornered and they are trying to survive. They are saving their regime from collapsing. But who is helping them to survive today? My guess would be GOSS, would that be fair to say?I hate to say that but then I would not like to shut up either because I belong to the South and am entitled to my opinion. If the GOSS declares unilateral independence, the GOS would be cut off from interfering in the South. They would not be able to support militias because they will have no supply lines.There will be no southern politician hiding in Khartoum claiming to be representing us while he's there promoting personal agendas and begging for welfare money.Are you with me? I'm coming to conclusion. GOSS is not capable of toppling GOS, so self declaration of independence should be the solution to the South Sudan. We will still have problems of Abyiei and Blue Nile, Nuba Mountain. However, they are already problematic, but I guess GOSS has lose grip of those areas already and GOS is spreading deeper southward ( Malakal).Let me say , we will get into that solution when we are free but not when we are squeezed southward which is the joy of GOS.Furthermore, we will try referendum in those areas of Abyiei, Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains, and if voting does work, we will fight as two independent nations. We will lock in all the militia leaders and grumpy politicians in the south.Above all we will be free. We will be moving to one direction. We will blame ourselves for our mistakes instead of pointing fingers to others. FREEDOM is not free, you fight for it. You earn it.<b>Written by Anyar Ngang Alith,T<a href="http://www.newsudanvision.com">he New Sudan Vision (NSV)</a></b><b>Wednesday, 25 March 2009</b><b><i>*Anyar Ngang is the moderator for <a href="http://www.southsudan-rallyfor-independence.com/">Rally for South Sudan Independence</a> website.He can be reached at <a href="anyarngang@gmail.com">anyarngang@gmail.com</a> </i></b></div>UNDERSTANDING THE SUDAN - Understanding Museveni, An Unusual Africanhttps://www.theblacklist.net/profiles/blogs/understanding-the-sudan2009-03-23T13:00:00.000Z2009-03-23T13:00:00.000ZKWASI Akyeamponghttps://www.theblacklist.net/members/KWASIAkyeampong<div><i>Dear Kwasi
Greetings
Trusting this finds you in good spirits.
Few Africans, outside of east Africa have much understanding of the Sudan
issues. I met last week the Special Advisor to the Namibia Foreign
Minister/President, to discuss Sudan. I noted that his was the standard
OAU/AU view, which is determined by the geo-political considerations
of east Africa. He knew little, nor cared much in my view, about the situation
of Darfurians, yet he partook in the Abuja Talks on peace for Darfur.
It is due to this type of remote concern for Africans on the ground which
lead to the failure of the Abuja Talks and all succeeding attempts to
bring peace to Darfur. Whereas the concerns of the Darfurians should, for
Africans, determine if talks are on or off. This Ambassador was a
member of Kofi Annan’s kitcken cabinet.
I will continue to send you insightful material on Sudan. Be aware
that Ben Larden is being shifted out of Pakistan to Somalia. He
was in Sudan before he went to Afghanistan. Bashir is reverting to
Islamic fundamentalism, which was his policy when he seized power,
but he later became more moderate, when he kicked Turabi out
as his principal advisor.
Please place the attachment on Museveni, as a special feature
Thanks
Best regards
<b><a href="http://theblaacklistpub.ning.com/profile/bfbankie">Bankie</a></b></i> <b>
<i>B.F.Bankie, former Researcher, Kush Institution, Juba, South Sudan.
He now resides in Windhoek, Namibia</i></b>
<b>Ugandan Yuweri Museveni, not the Usual Black African</b>
<b><i>By <a href="stevepaterno@yahoo.com">Steve Paterno</a></i></b>
May 8, 2008 — President Yuweri Museveni of Uganda is arguably among the very few from the African leaders who are able to deal squarely with the Arabs, especially those Arabs in Khartoum (Sudan).
Museveni places the Arab manufactured war in Sudan into its proper context. He seems to understand the potential consequences of that war to the entire region better than most regional leaders.
In addressing the issue of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group which is long been supported from Sudan, Museveni explains in a clear tone of voice that for the last two decades since the Uganda government is fighting with the rebel, it is in fact “fighting with the Khartoum government.” He goes on to warn the Arab regime in Khartoum that the regime has just recently “discovered that we were not the usual Black Africans. If you create problems for us we create more problems for you.”
The Arabs’ march from Arabian Peninsular with the intention of conquering not just Africa but the entire world started in the 7th century. Matter of fact, the conquering Arabs did not just march but sprinted fast through the desert and in the process, plundering, killing, converting, enslaving, conquering and eventually ruling whoever is on the way. All the areas under their sphere of control including the Sudan are placed under Arab Islamic rule.
Strategically enough, the Sudan has become springboard for the Arabs to spread their project of Arabization and Islamization south of equator and proceed all the way deep into Southern Africa. However, for centuries, the people of South Sudan put a hold on their advancement by strongly resisting against it. For centuries, the people of South Sudan keeps reminding the African south of equator that the people of South Sudan are fighting the war of all those Africans south of equator, and for centuries, the people of South Sudan are soliciting the support of the African south of equator to help in the resistance against the advancement of Arabs southward.
In their part, the Arabs use all available options at their disposal to press with their agendas of Arabization and Islamization and forcefully move south across the equator. One of such options is that the Arabs use the Africans to do the work for them. They install and sponsor puppet African leaders to speak or act on behalf of the Arabs. They create several armed groups. In South Sudan those armed groups are infamously referred to as militias. Some of the groups, the foreign ones, become rebels or terrorists, causing havoc throughout the region. Among the foreign groups at disposal of the Arabs of Khartoum’s is the brutal LRA of Uganda.
The case of LRA is just among the most interesting ones, given the twist it has recently taken. For some obvious reasons, the officials at the government of South Sudan (GOSS), inherited and adopted the LRA and all its problems. Just at a critical moment at LRA’s history when the LRA is pushed outside Uganda; its sanctuaries in the South Sudan were denied; its logistic from Khartoum was cut off; and the whole international community was about to pound on its members with all means possible including legal; then the misguided officials of the newly created GOSS, invited the LRA to stay. A poorly contemplated peace talks was proposed and organized. The LRA, are then supplied with cash money, food, and other necessary logistics just as Khartoum used to do. Specially designated areas are demarcated to the LRA combatants as their newly found sanctuaries. In short, the GOSS, which is representing the people of SouthSudan, becomes the host of the LRA just as Khartoum was the host of LRA. And the LRA takes advantage of the situation to inflict even more harms to the suffering population of South Sudan, spread beyond their area of control, and resurge in numbers and recruitments—posing more threats than ever before in its history.
Such a twist of events will leave many to wonder. Nevertheless, it is becoming more obvious that President Museveni is the only lone voice and fighter against the Arabs of Khartoum and those who act on their behalf. The GOSS, which Museveni came to its rescue, seems to have abandoned him already in this fight. However, there is still hope for the suffering people of South Sudan that Museveni still stands with them. Museveni made that point clear when he sympathetically states, “nevertheless, the government of Uganda and her people are standing firm with the people of Southern Sudan who suffered so much from LRA atrocities and we the government of Uganda have the means to solve some of these problems posed by the LRA.” One will guess, it will not be too much for the suffering people of South Sudan to ask for the help of their neighbor, Uganda, “to solve some of these problems posed by the LRA” and partly cause by their government, the GOSS. Since their government, the GOSS or is it the Ghost, fails them, Museveni should hear the request of the suffering people of South Sudan for you are “not the usual Black African!”
<b>Steve Paterno is the author of The Rev. Fr. Saturnino Lohure, A Romain Catholic Priest Turned Rebel. He can be reached at <a href="stevepaterno@yahoo.com">stevepaterno@yahoo.com</a></b></div>SOUTH SUDAN–UNITY OR SEPARATION? THE OPTIONS.https://www.theblacklist.net/profiles/blogs/south-sudanunity-or-separation2009-03-17T11:02:28.000Z2009-03-17T11:02:28.000ZBF Bankiehttps://www.theblacklist.net/members/BFBankie<div>South Sudan Cross-Road: UNITY OR SEPARATION?BY: An authentic SPLM/government bureaucratFEB: 17/2009, SSN;<b>1. Introduction</b>By 2011, the people of South Sudan (SS) will go to the ballot box to vote between <b>unity</b> and <b>separation.</b> The time frame will be worked out by the National Elections Commission.The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has listed four principles that give the SS people options to make choice between Unity or Separation. One of these principles states that:<i><b>“The people of South Sudan have the right to Self-determination, inter alia, through a referendum to determine their future status.”</b> (Part A. Agreed Principles, 1.3, p2. CPA, 2005)</i>Self-determination (SD) is a political Human Right for the oppressed people in the world. East Timor, Georgia and Eritrea, to mention few countries, are among the recent countries that benefited from this right. They stood always for one thing – Separation, right from day one to the end. In the case of South Sudan, it is different as we will see below. We are on the <b>cross-road situation created by our leadership</b>. That is why in SS we are divided and seriously debating over Unity or Separation (to cont…below).The second important principle gives the SS people the time frame stating that:<i><b>“At the end of the six (6) years Interim period there shall be an internationally monitored referendum organized jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of Government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.”</b>. (Sec. 2.5, p8. CPA, 2005).”</i>The people of SS, no doubt, are eagerly looking forward to that day to cast their ballot papers into one of the two boxes labeled: Unity or Separation. It is assumed that the conduct of voting will be free, fair and transparent.If the majority of the SS people voted for Separation, then the South would be declared independent as from that day onward. However, if the majority of the SS people voted for Unity, then the SS will remain part of the Greater Sudan.<b>What happens when SS people voted for Unity?</b>In the case SS people voted for Unity, the CPA has provided the third and fourth principles to protect the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and all its Political Institutions from being affected. The third principle states that:<i><b>“The unity of the Sudan, based on the free will of its people, democratic governance, accountability, equality, respect, and justice for all the citizens of the Sudan, is and shall be the priority of the parties and that it is possible to redress the grievances of the people of the South Sudan and to meet their aspirations within such a framework.”</b> (Part A: Agreed principles 1.1 p2. CPA, 2005)</i>This principle lays a solid foundation for Unity if implemented properly. It makes Unity attractive to the people of SS and all the other marginalized Sudanese people. As a matter of fact this principle should be extended to cover all the marginalized regions of Sudan including Darfur, Southern Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, and Eastern Region (Kasala), to (cont…below).The fourth principle seems to be even more attractive to Unity and can serve as the pivotal for Unity which states that:<i><b>“The people of South Sudan have the right to control and govern affairs in their region and participate equitably in the National Government.”</b> (Part A. Agreed Principles. Sec 1.2. P2. CPA, 2005)</i>This principle confirms the present set up of the Government status of the SS within the Greater Sudan. Under Unity, Juba continues to enjoy its Parliament, Government, Security, judiciary and the Government Ministries. At the same time the SS people continue to elect members of National Assembly and ministers appointed to GoNU Government in Khartoum. The oil revenue continues to be shared.Having read several articles in the internet written by SS intellectuals for and against Unity, I decided to write this article with the hope that it provokes more thinking and fruitful discussions. In particular, the Observer intends to challenge the SS intellectuals, even Northerners, to discuss this topic without emotions. This is absolutely necessary for the enlightenment of our people at the grassroots so that they vote wisely in 2011.This article covers the following sections: section one is the introduction of the four CPA principles in relation to Unity; section two is the brief history of how the SS people wrestled with Khartoum on the question of Federal System for the Sudan; section three addresses the Vision of our leader Dr. John Garang- the New Sudan as opposed to old Sudan; section four attempts to provide some answers to the questions: “Why Separation? Why Unity? Section five is the way forward and section six is the conclusion.<b>2. Brief History of Sudan</b>Historically, South Sudan has been requesting for Federal system with Khartoum instead of Separation. In 1958, one of the Southern members of Parliament, provoked by a Northern colleague in the Parliament said, “if South Sudan had indeed wanted to break away from the North, no human being on earth would have stopped it.” He had to say this when his colleague accused the Southerners of trying to break away from the North, as the Southerners insisted on Federal system in Sudan.Before that incident and after, chances for SS to separate or at least to request for separation from Khartoum had come and gone. There was the popular Juba Conference June 1947 when the SS people could have told the British in no uncertain terms to separate from Khartoum. They did not. Instead they asked for Federal system which was played down later on by Khartoum. The Southern representatives were manipulated by Khartoum representatives who told them to suspend their demand until the Sudan had obtained independence from the British. Khartoum later on rejected the Federal idea even before the Independence Day. However, this was followed by the revolt of the Torit Peace Corps in August 1955. The Torit revolt sent a signal to Khartoum to the possible delay of the Independence which Khartoum would not stomach. So Khartoum once again accepted the Federal idea for the Sudan. In December 1955, in the Parliament in Khartoum, the Southerners agreed to sign a document for Federal Sudan just before the Independence (January 1956). Of course it was never implemented. When the Southerners pressed hard for the implementation of the Federal Sudan, in 1958, Khartoum, at night, handed over the Government to the Army.Even as late as the 1965 Round Table Conference in Khartoum, the Southerners settled for Federation with Khartoum instead of going straight for Separation. This decision was painfully taken after the massacre of thousands of Southerners in Juba and Wau in August 1965 by Khartoum Government. In 1972 the Southerners willingly settled for Local Autonomy Government without even attempting to mention the word Separation to Nimeri. The point I am making here is that the Southerners, at any time in history, were never shown to be separatists. Khartoum promises were always empty and as a result the SS people were left with no option except to resort to armed struggle. Thus the offer of Government of Local Autonomy of 1972 and the offer of the self-determination of 2005 resulted from two bitter civil wars between Khartoum and the South. It has been the political game played by Khartoum Government for fifty years.Today our stand is as polarized as ever. We are divided right from the top leadership of the GoSS Government down to the messengers. Dr. John Garang, our wise leader, was the first to strongly oppose Separation. As a result Mr. Gai Tut and Mr. Abdalla Chol had to loose their lives because of their insistence to fight for Separation. Today we are on the cross-road situation because we are not sure and the leadership is not sure of what we want. Why are we not sure? (see below).<b>3. The Vision of Dr. John Garang</b>During the period of SPLM/A armed struggle (1983-2005) until the abortive coup of 1991 the word Separation was a crime, punishable by death as stated above. Since that time onward nobody else talked openly about the word separation. Of course, with time, the sense of humor later on developed among the SPLM leadership which resulted in the creation of the terms: Unionist and Separatist. Dr. John Garang was labeled as a Unionist together with those who agreed with him. Others were labeled as Separatists. <b>What was the Vision of Dr. John Garang in the Movement?</b>The Vision of Dr. Garang can be summarized in the following words: <i>The struggle was against the old Sudan that was run by traditional Sectarian leaders of Khartoum, who used to marginalize other parts of the country such as South Sudan, Western Sudan, South Blue Nile, Eastern Kassala and Nuba Mountains. The old Sudan had to be destroyed and replaced by New Democratic Sudan where all the citizens are equal, enjoy freedom of worship, equal opportunity, equal development, respect for Human Rights and justice for all.</i>This is the vision of Dr. John Garang, the leader of SPLM/A supported by most of his commanders but opposed by others. Because of this powerful Vision of New Sudan, majority of the Nuba people, South Blue Nile, Kassala and now Darfur plus those in the cities supported the SPLM/A and indeed some of them joined the war in the bush because of that Vision.Over six million Sudanese people came to Khartoum Airport to welcome Dr. John Garang in July 2005. They supported Garang´s Vision of New Sudan.In 1998 Garang visited Egypt where he convinced President Hussni Mubarak and his Government that he was a Unionist, not a Separatist. Garang believed in a New Democratic Sudan with modern values as opposed to the old despotic Sudan. He wanted to extend the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) model to the other regions as the best solution of their political problems. He wanted to establish the New Democratic Sudan in Khartoum whereby all the five regions of Sudan converge to form a truly strong Federal Government. The Constitution of this Federal Government would be worked out by the elected Parliament in Khartoum. Unfortunately, he did not live to follow his vision through.I am therefore, wondering which Vision of Garang do we, the leaders of SPLM/A, claim we will always follow and implement? Are we still holding to the humor of Unionists vs. Separatists?It is clear that the GoSS leaders are indecisive on this point. This is why today they are for Unity and the next day, they are for Separation. No wonder the SS people are indeed in dilemma - cross-road.<b>4. Why Separation?</b>There are many reasons why SS people may vote for Separation and yet as it will be seen below, Separation may not be the best choice because that is what Khartoum wants to happen so that they continue with Old Sudan policies of marginalization, oppression and intimidation of the rest of the other regions.However, having said this, the following are some of the reasons which can possibly be used by the SS people to vote for Separation:<i>· The people of the South have neither forgiven nor forgotten the past when during the Turco-Egyptian rule in Sudan (1820-81) and during the Mahadiya/Khalifa Reign (1881-98) the Northerners looked at the South as a zone for exploitation of natural resources and slaves. Most Southerners still believe that this attitude of Northerners has not changed. For this reason they prefer Separation more than Unity.· Southerners are afraid to unite with the Northerners because they fear that they may lose their cultures and languages to be replaced by Arab cultures and the Arabic language.· The Northerners always dominate the Government in Khartoum. As such they always marginalize the other regions politically and economically, including the South. Unity will therefore, put the South at disadvantage.· Economically, the Governments in Khartoum are interested in developing the North only while keeping the other parts of Sudan backward for their own exploitation.· The Southerners, from the beginning strongly opposed the introduction of Sharia Law into the country because it was crafted by NIF as a political weapon to isolate the majority of the Sudanese people from participating in the Government. In future, Unity might bring Sharia Law to be imposed on the South Sudan.</i><b>5. Why Unity?</b><i>a) We all know and agree that the history of Sudan is very dark; nobody likes it and nobody will want to return to it except those few who prosper out of it. But we also know and agree that we have come a long way out of the darkness of our history and the bright future of the Sudan is just around the corner where the Vision of Dr. John Garang – the New Sudan, is going to be implemented because with Unity Khartoum is left with no option except to implement the Vision. And Southerners should be part of that New Sudan together with the marginalized regions.b) Today we are free people and strong enough to fight anybody who dares to introduce slavery to our community. Together with the other marginalized areas of Sudan, we are liberated and together we can build a better New Sudan free from slavery, exploitation, oppression, justice for all and Law and order. We in the South Sudan should not fear anybody at all except God. But we should be prepared to work hard and compete effectively with others. That is what Dr. John Garang stood for and that is what he meant by New Sudan.c) Since the British rule until Independence, the people of the South Sudan always treat the North as one people bound by Islam, Arabic Language and culture with one purpose to exploit the SS for their own good. Little did the people of the South know that among the Northerners there are also a lot of differences in culture, languages, politics, marginalization and racial discrimination? Is it not proper that the Southerners together with the other marginalized brothers in the North continue to fight the Khartoum oppressors politically and economically? Together we shall create and build the New Sudan.d) The people of SS loose nothing to vote for Unity. On the contrary, they should benefit more from Unity. For example:· If the people of SS voted for unity, they will still have the “Right to control and govern affairs in their region and participate equitably in the National Government.” (see the third and fourth principles above). This is exactly the federal system the people of the South have been fighting for since 1947.· We are part of Greater Sudan, the largest in Africa and the richest in natural resources, agriculture and animal production, wildlife, water resources, oil, iron ore, zinc, manganese, gold, uranium, etc. We are a gifted country and we should thank God for all of this. Why should we not share these riches with the other marginalized Sudanese Communities?· We are landlocked region with economic potential, we need a port of our own and that is Port Sudan not Mombasa. We can only use Mombasa as supplement to Port Sudan; otherwise, we will be slaves to Kenya. Time will come when the honey moon is over and then Kenya will dictate on us on their facilities of their harbor.e) The right to self-determination should not be treated as if it were a private property of the South Sudan. Darfur is now asking for the right of self-determination or even separation and soon the rest may follow. It is clear that the situation in Sudan has changed greatly. In the Anyanya 1 war of 17 years (1955–72), Khartoum used Islam to rally the African Muslims in the North to fight the people of the South. Today the equation has changed greatly. Khartoum strategy today is neither Islam nor Arab Culture. It is something else! The Northern black Muslims including Darfur are now legitimate targets. These tactics of Khartoum will not end until all the Sudanese people are indeed liberated. Breaking away from Khartoum will not solve the problem because Khartoum will continue to manipulate the rest of the regions, once again, to destabilize the South or any other region. If we vote for unity, we will play leading role of the five marginalized regions and indeed build the new Sudan that our great leader John Garang has been dreaming about and therefore, change Sudan into a better prosperous place instead of leaving it to the handful of people in Khartoum.f) As a matter of fact the solution to all the political problems in Sudan lies in the application of the CPA model to all the five regions. Every region has the right to run their affairs with little interference from Khartoum.</i><b>6. The Way Forward?</b>There is a serious dilemma, a cross-road situation, that the people of South Sudan (the grass-root) are facing and they definitely need guidance from the leadership with one voice. The question they usually ask is what is the way forward? Should they vote for Unity or Separation?The analysis above has shown that the Southerners should Vote for Unity. The New Sudan we have fought for by losing two million Southerners is still far from being achieved. The Old Sudan is very active in its operations and threatens the very existence of the New Sudan. As soon as the Southerners voted for Separation in 2011 and withdraw from Khartoum National Parliament, the GoNU, other National Institutions, Civil Societies, etc, the New Sudan concept will be over. Once the “troublesome” Southerners are out from Khartoum and the other towns of the North, the enemies of New Sudan will not waste time but celebrate and clean up the supporters of the New Sudan in Khartoum and elsewhere in the Northern towns. The GoSS in Juba will have more political, socioeconomic, security problems than they have ever seen in their lives. There will be no peace in South Sudan. Khartoum will mobilize our disappointed supporters to destabilize the South forever.So, to avoid going back to square one; let us fight for our rights and dignity within the United Sudan. Our fore fathers did it before and we have done it twice in our lifetime. We will do it again if necessary, this time politically in Khartoum together with the other marginalized people. At this time, in history, we are not alone, we are five marginalized regions: the South Sudan, the Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, Kassala and Darfur.We all converge in Khartoum and work together to create and build the New Sudan that Dr. John Garang had visualized.This is the New Sudan, the powerful Democratic and free Sudan that we are all dreaming of to happen in the ten, twenty, thirty or fifty years to come. This is the Sudan around the corner with bright and better future for our posterity/children. So, let us Go and Vote for Unity. Do not be afraid for we lose nothing. The reverse is indeed darkness and isolation.<b>6. Conclusion</b>The Sudan has been slowly undergoing changes from the Old toward the New Sudan and it will never be the same again. The SS people should remember that they have been part of these changes throughout. They have endured sufferings for too long and have spilt too much blood on this land called THE SUDAN. The sufferings of the marginalized and the blood of the two million Southerners shall not be in vain but override separation and replace Old Sudan with the New Democratic Sudan. <b>And we are part of that New Sudan. So let us VOTE for Unity!! Let us VOTE for New Sudan.</b>SPLM Woyeee! New Sudan Woyeee! GoSS Woyeee!<u><i>(Name withheld on request)</i></u>Envoy in EuropeRefs:1. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). 2005.2. Yosa Wawa. The Southern Sudanese Pursuits of Self-Determination: Documents in Political History. 2005.3. PM Holt & MW Daly. The History of the Sudan From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day.</div>SUDAN: A CASE FOR AN INDEPENDENT TRIBUNAL FOR FINAL RECONCILIATIONhttps://www.theblacklist.net/profiles/blogs/2055350-BlogPost-89962008-07-24T16:09:16.000Z2008-07-24T16:09:16.000ZBF Bankiehttps://www.theblacklist.net/members/BFBankie<div>A CASE FOR AN INDEPENDENT TRIBUNAL FOR FINAL RECONCILIATION-Government of South Sudan (GOSS) rubs salt in 1992 scars - by Opoka Christopher Amanjur.Page 8, Juba Post, <a href="http://www.k2-media.org/jubapost/go/index.php">http://www.k2-media.org/jubapost/go/index.php</a>Juba, South Sudan, 3-7 July 2008A failure on the part of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) has cast further doubt as to the legacy if the victims of the 1992 slaughters of innocent officers of the Prisons, Wild Life, Police and Army as well as civilians that perished and left hundreds of orphans and widows in the region.A demand that the 7th July every year be dedicated to the memory of the brutal killings of innocent Southern Sudanese on mere allegations of collaboration with the SPLA has fallen on the death unresponsive attention of the ears of GOSS as well as at the CentralEquitoria State government level. In an interview with The Juba Post, one such widow narrated her husband’s seemingly fated death amidst repeated sobs and wimps. She was a mother of two daughters when her husband was killed. It was a Sunday morning and she noticed her husband was ill at ease. She begged him to tell her what was worrying him but he just remained silent. Later that day friends came around telling him to go into hiding, but then ‘there was no place to hide’. She explained that ‘Arkangello’ feared that his family would be killed if he disappeared. ’It was a sacrifice on his part’, but now the government cannot even allow me to celebrate and mourn the death of my husband in dignity she added. The year 1992 has scars that have never healed. Many widows of the infamous ‘White House brutal murders’ confessed that, the government has done little to address their plight. They have on several occasions argued for their right to exclusiveness in according them a separate day to mourn and conduct a vigil in memory of their loved ones. Others, however, have little empathy to accommodate the inaction of the government. Such groups have gone as far as pointing fingers at people in the high ranks of the government in treading their sincere request in the mud. They have sworn not to vote for such people come parliamentary and presidential elections. Others have threatened to expose the involvement of these leaders in other follies that have been kept silent as graves.In particular one woman who requested for anonymity for fear of her life and that of her surviving two children, questioned the legitimacy of leaders in Southern Sudan, many of whom she said have failed to reconcile themselves with their past deeds. ‘Horrendous things have happened but our people have learnt that it’s better to keep silent and cry in loud silence‘, she said in a thick tone of sarcasm and irony.In other quarters, the victims of the 1992 massacre have been sung as heroes who paved the way with their bloodshed, for the renegotiation of previous failed agreements in Southern Sudan. A shockingly irritating revelation, however, is that the wives of these unrecognized heroes have been deserted by the government to either fend for themselves or to toil in squalid living conditions. More recently, a letter by The Association of 1992Widows sent tantrums in Parliament where no conclusive consensus was reached for reasons best known to the actors.These women are calling on politicians to stop politicizing the death of their husbands for selfish political gains. They are asking the government to help them reconcile with the past by exposing the actors and perpetrators of the 1992 crimes. These women believe and are confident that the leaders in the then national security, who orchestrated these heinous crimes, are still living at large either in Khartoum or abroad somewhere in the Arab world. ‘Our call for justice will never end until GOSS brings everything out in the open’, said one woman. The women have also forwarded a request for the government to address their plight of poverty, disease, education and land for settlement.</div>