By B.F.Bankie
bankie@mweb.com.na
Introduction
The
name ‘
Sudan
’ has more or less been the same all through history. Aside from the
toponyms relating to the south (such as Hent-Hen-Nefer
and Wawat), it has been
associated with the colour of blackness (such as Ta-Nehesu, Kush, Kerma,
Æthiopia, Nubia,
al-Saltana al-Zarqā’
and lastly al-Sūdān)
(Sagheiroun, 1999), which was - and is still - the colour of its people,
since the early times of the ancient civilizations of the Nile valley up to
the present. The same name seems to have evolved by translation from one
language to another in the course of time. This, regarding belonging and
identity, puts
Sudan
in the heart of
Africa
, which is rightly called the Black Continent. What seem to be differences
of colour among the Sudanese are nothing more than the shades of blackness.
The
significance of the name ‘
Sūdān
’ is important, because it
bears very strong identity implication. The Arabized people of middle
Sudan
, generally speaking, tend not to recognize themselves as black Africans. As
the State for the last five centuries has belonged ideologically to this
group,
Sudan
has ended up identifying itself more with the Arabs than with black
Africa
. This issue is central to the contemporary problem of the reality of the
Sudan
and national integration.
The
State
In
what roughly constitutes the geography of present day
Sudan
, the State has prevailed all through history. Archaeologically the State
can be traced back seven thousand years at least (Welsby, 2000). Like in
other parts of
Africa
, the State functioned in a kind of federal autonomy where the
ethno-cultural entities were its political nucleuses. The vast geographical
space necessitated that justice be the key for any ruler to reign for long.
Seeking a better place to live in was handy and convenient for every ethnic
group thus leaving any tyrant to rule either the desert or the jungle.
Today’s demand for self-determination by different marginalized groups is
the modern manifestation and formulation of the history-long practice, to
pull out from any state that does not answer equally the longing of its
different subject-groups for freedom,
justice and peace.
At
no time was there any kind of political vacuum in the
Sudan
. The traditional tribal federacy of ancient
Sudan
was maintained in the Christian era (650BC-1505AD), to also prevail later in
the Funj Sultanate (1505AD-1821AD).
The
People
All
the people of present day
Sudan
contributed in making the ancient civilization of
Sudan
. The people who call themselves ‘Arab’ have their rightly recognizable
share in building that civilization since they are a mixture of Arabs and
indigenous people. In fact the weaving of the ethno-linguistic fabric in
Sudan
, which is taken for granted to be heterogeneous, reflects homogeneity as
well. For instance, taking the Eastern Sudanic group, we may well be amazed
to see people living on the Sudan-Uganda borders (e.g. the Baria) are
related as cousins to people living on the Sudan-Egypt borders (Nubians) and
both people are related to others living on the Sudan-Ethiopia borders in
the Funj region (e.g. Ingassana) and all of them are related in the same way
to other groups living on the Sudan-Chad borders (e.g. Daju). We must bear
in mind that before the Arabization of middle
Sudan
those people were in a dynamic contact with each other. This is an ancient
land with ancient people and an ancient civilization; the least to be
expected is that they are interrelated ethno-linguistically.
Religion
In
this regard two things have characterized
Sudan
all through history; it has always been multi-religious and religiously
tolerant. Ancient polytheism accommodated other deities which have survived
in today’s traditional religions. The Treasurer of the Candace of Meroe
(800BC-450AD) was a Jew who converted to Christianity in its early days
apparently without fearing the slightest persecution. Christianity did not
invade the
Sudan
(Vantini, 1978; Werner et al,
2000); it was the Sudanese who asked for it. In Dongola, the capital of the
Christian
Kingdom
of
Nubia
(650AD-1350AD), there was a Mosque for which the
Christian
State
was responsible. In Soba (25km south of Khartoum on the Blue Nile), the
capital of the Christian Kingdom of Alodia (650AD-1505AD) there were about
300 Churches, there was also a Mosque within a hamlet assigned for the
Muslims.
In
the 19th century Christianity would catch up again as a result of
intensive missionary work. The biggest Christian communities are in the
South and the
Nuba
Mountains
and in the big urban centres. In the face of the rise of Islamization and
Arabization as vehicles for facilitating the domination of the central
state, Christianity would get involved and eventually it would become, along
with Africanism, the ideological backbone in countering Islamo-Arabism.
Islam
broke the encapsulation of
Sudan
and opened it to the outer world of that time. The transformation from
Christianity to Islam was a gradual process thus giving way to a distinctive
mix of Sudanese cosmology and culture of tolerance. A Sudanese Islam was in
the making that finally took its shape in the Sufi sects that flourished in
post-Christian
Sudan
, thus bringing about an effective acculturation of indigenous practices and
Islamic teachings. The local people transformed from the traditional and
Christian choirs to the Sufi chanting smoothly
The
conversion to Islam culminated in the Funj Sultanate (1505AD-1820AD), which
retained many ancient features with regard to administration and cultural
symbols (Spaulding, 1980). The traditional system of tribal federacy, with
its inherent democratic practices, was maintained. Other ancient practices
such as the ritual killing of the king (regicide) and the Christian headgear
and regalia were also retained. In the beginning Sufi Islam assumed
supremacy in reflecting the ideology of the State. A little later a rival
came into the scene represented in scholastic Islam that could only be
acquired through classroom teaching at such religious centres like al-Azhar
in
Cairo
(Yahya Ibrāhīm, 1980). Where Sufi Islam interacts with the
local society, scholastic Islam challenges it in its persistent endeavours
to reshape it according to its own norms. Where the former does not give
heed to the penal code of the Sharī‛a as literally stated in the
scriptures, the latter only pays attention to the scriptures without giving
any heed to the realities of setting and context. At the beginning many
scholastic shaykhs took to denouncing their jurisprudence by throwing away
their symbolic scholastic graduation robes, to declare themselves as Sufi.
In the end this would be reversed.
Sufi
Islam could have won the rivalry if it were not for the Turco-Egyptian
colonial rule (1820AD-1885AD) which introduced the culture of official
Muslim clergymen who were appointed and paid by the state and who adhered to
scholastic Islam as they were mostly graduates of al-Azhar Mosque-University
in
Cairo
. That rule also introduced the modern educational system where the
classrooms were also made available for this kind of Islam to flourish.
The
Mahdia Islamic state (1885AD-1899AD) represents the ultimate victory of the
scholastic Islam over the Sufi Islam. The Mahdi was a Sufi man who revolted
against what he took to be leniency on behalf of the Sufi shaykhs towards
the traditions of people which - according to his own views - did not follow
the book of Sharī‛a. The Mahdia state understandably followed a
strict scholastic Islam. Thenceforward the Sufi Islam would gradually
identify with the scholastic Islam so as to catch up in the long run. By the
late decades of the 20th century the two could hardly be
distinguished from each other.
The
British-Egyptian ( ‘the Condominium‘) colonial rule (1899AD-1956AD)
resumed the same system of the Turco-Egyptian rule with regard to
government-sponsored education and the culture of official Muslim clergymen.
By the time the
Sudan
achieved independence the educated class was mostly orientated to scholastic
Islam. This showed in the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalist movements
among the students of higher educational institutions.
Al-Jallāba:
the Slave Traders of
Sudan
Slavery
was practised in
Sudan
since ancient times. The Arabs in the Paqt Treaty demanded from the
Christian Nubians slaves that were brought from hinterlands. However it was
more or less African traditional slavery resulting from petty tribal feuds
and wars. It kept on like that in the early time of the Funj Sultanate until
the Europeans began making incursions into the continent to procure slaves.
It was the Turco-Egyptian colonial rule that launched the era of mass
slavery in the
Sudan
. They made it a state-policy loaded with the whole weight of Arab cultural
stigmatization of the blacks. Locally, the Arabized people of the centre,
which was growing fast, followed their lead. They played the role of the
intermediary who organized the raids, captured the blacks and then sold
them. The term al-Jallāba is
a plural adjective in Sudanese colloquial Arabic literally meaning the
procurers. The singular is jallābi.
The term originated in reference to the intermediary slavers who were mostly
Arabized Sudanese. The culture of al-Jallāba
had a big impact in consolidating the establishment of the
centre. When the Turco-Egyptian colonial rule was compelled to abolish
slavery, al-Jallāba
defied that and boldly continued to practice it. By that time their raiding
squads had developed into formidable armies. In the last decade of the Turco-Egyptian
colonial rule, Al-Zubayr wad Rahama, their leading slaver, led his slaving
army and conquered Dar Fur. In fact they were just one step from becoming
the rulers of the
Sudan
. The Turco-Egyptian rule not only recognized the de facto al-Zubayr’s governorship of Dar Fur, but further
bestowed on him the prestigious title of ‘Pasha’. The Jallāba cherished the prospects of inheriting the faltering
Turco-Egyptian rule. If it were not for the Mahdia revolution that took
place, they would have assumed that power.
The
Mahdia state, strictly following the scripture of Islam where there is no
direct verse from either the Qur’an or the Prophet traditions abolishing
slavery, indulged itself in reinstating the institution of slavery. However
it strongly abolished tobacco and snuff although
there is no direct verse either from the Qur’an or the Prophet traditions
to that effect. Understandably the pragmatic and Machiavellian Jallāba were among the first to declare their allegiance to
the Mahdia. They put their huge military resources and expertise at the
service of the Mahdia. That is one of the factors that made the Mahdia state
to belong ideologically to the Arabized centre.
Backed
with its colonialist pragmatism, the British-Egyptian rule that succeeded
the Mahdia had very soon consolidated its alliance with the Arabized centre.
Although officially declared abolished, slavery was tolerated as a practice
and culture (Saikinga, 1996). In post-Independent
Sudan
, national rule clearly showed its stand in this regard by naming a street
in
Khartoum
after al-Zubayr Pasha, the most notorious slaver in
Sudan
’s modern history. In fact the culture of slavery is truly the catalyst
behind the bad treatment of the black Africans of Sudan, who live in the
periphery around the Arabized middle. Successive national governments have
shown this malignity which takes place under the pretext of curbing the
civil war. As elsewhere in the global African presence, for instance in
Southern Africa
and its contacts with Apartheid, the core problem in
Sudan
is one of Arab racism and the need to change the mindset of Arabs in general
vis-a- vis Africans.
The
Arabization of the
Sudan
and the power-related conflicts of identity
The
Demise of the
Christian
Kingdoms
of the
Sudan
With
the weakening of the Christian kingdoms, between the 14th and 16th
centuries, many Islamic and Arabized kinglets began appearing and eventually
succeeded in replacing the old regime (Fadl, 1973; Shibeika, 1991). The
first was the Kunūz (Bani al-Kanz)
kingdom around Asuan area in present-day Egyptian Nubia, to be followed a
little later by the Rabī‛a-Beja Islamic kinglet of Hajar (
Eastern Sudan
). In the late 15th
century the Islamic kinglet of Tegali (Togole) in the
Nuba
Mountain
(West-Middle Sudan) came into existence. A century later the Ottoman Sultan
Selim the Second made a thrust deep into
Nubia
in the aftermath of which appeared the Northern Nubian Islamic kinglets of
the Kushshāf, Mahas, and Argo (
Northern Sudan
). Two centuries later the Fur
kingdom
of
Kunjāra
was established upon the fall of the Tunjur kinglet (
Western Sudan
). But the most important was the Funj Sultanate which came into existence
in the early 16th century and which succeeded in spreading its
influence over most of these kingdoms.
The
Funj Sultanate came into existence with slavery looming in the background
and with the colour black fully stigmatized by being synonymous with
‘slave’. By the turn of the 15th century, Soba, the
capital of the last Christian
kingdom
of
Alodia
, fell at the hands of the Arabized people (known in middle
Sudan
as the Arabs). Having its founders being virtually blacks, it was
understandably called ‘al-Saltana
al-Zarqā’, i.e. the ‘Black Sultanate’. As it came in
response to the growing influence of the Islamo-Arabized Sudanese it
explicitly showed an Arab and Islamic orientation. The new formations of
Arabized tribes began claiming Arab descent supported with mostly fabricated
genealogies. The small family units compensated for their vulnerability by
claiming the noble ‘sharīf’
descent, i.e. descendants of Prophet Muhammad; eventually in the name of
this descent they would appropriate both wealth and power, something the
immediate descendants were not ordained to have while Prophet Muhammad was
still alive. To be on an equal footing with these tribes in matters
pertaining to power and authority, the Funj also claimed an Umayyad descent.
Scholars in Arabic and Islamic sciences from other parts of the Islamic
world were encouraged to settle in the
Sudan
.
Arabization
and the Rise of Islam
Thenceforward
the Arabized Africans of middle
Sudan
would pose as non-black Arabs. Intermarriage with light-skinned people would
be consciously sought as a process of cleansing blood from blackness. A long
process of identity change began; in order to have access to power and to be
at least accepted as free humans, African people tended to drop both their
identities and languages and replace them with Arabic language and Arab
identity. A new ideological awareness of race and colour came into being.
The shades of the colour of blackness were perceived as authentic racial
differentiations (Deng, 1995). A Sudanese-bound criterion for racial colour
was formed by which the light black was seen as an Arab (wad ‛Arab and wad
balad), i.e. white or at least non-black. The jet-black Sudanese was
seen as an African, i.e. slave (‛abd).
Then a host of derogatory terms were generated in the culture and colloquial
Arabic of middle
Sudan
which dehumanize the black Africans.
Right
there the seeds of Sudanese ideology of Arab-oriented dominance over the
Africans were sown. It works through two mechanisms: 1) the stigma of slavery, blackness and people of African identity, who
occupy the margin and surrounding periphery and 2) the prestigma of the free, non-black and Arab, who occupy the centre.
This ideology, in its drive to achieve self-actualization, underlines a
process of alienation and domination. While posing as whites, they do not
hold white people proper in high esteem. They largely indulged themselves in
stigmatizing the Africans and prestigmatizing the Arabs with whom they
identify. This ideology of alienation has prevailed for the last five
centuries up to the present moment. It has been consolidated by successive
political regimes whether Turco-Egyptian or Egyptian-British or national
rule. It finds its roots in the vice of slavery. No wonder slavery was once
again in full swing by the late 20th century as a result of the
intensifying grip of the state
by Islamo-Arabism. By sublimating the Arab as a model for them through this
erroneously confused concept of race, the Arabized people of
Sudan
have made themselves second-class Arabs. The repercussions of this would not
only affect them, but their whole country and would lead to a widening
divide between Arabism and Africanism.
Sudan
is a nation whose identity has been divisively distorted and is
rediscovering itself, albeit in a tragically violent way. The silver lining
is that a more constructive search for an identity framework around which
Sudanese could unite may be within reach.
As
with most, if not all African countries, the colonial power brought together
into a state framework national groups that had been distinctive, separate
and in some cases mutually hostile. The identities that are currently in
conflict are the result of a historical legacy characterized by a form of
slavery that classified groups into a superior race of masters and inferior
enslaveable peoples. The North, two-thirds of the country’s land and
population, is inhabited by ethnic groups, the more dominant of which
intermarried with incoming Arab male migrants and traders and, over
centuries, produced a mixed African-Arab racial group that resembles the
African peoples south of the
Sahara
. Indeed, the Arabic phrase, Bilad al-Sudan (‘land of the blacks’)
refers to all of those sub-Saharan territories. Arab immigration and
settlement in the South was blocked by distance, environmental barriers, the
harsh tropical climate and resistance of the warrior Nilotic tribes. Those
Arabs who ventured southwards were primarily slave raiders, driven by
commerce, not interest in Arabising and Islamising the South.
As
the dominant partner in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the British ended
slavery and effectively governed the country as two separated colonies. They
developed the North as an Arab-Muslim society and forged in the South an
identity that was indigenously African, exposed to Western influences
through Christian missionaries, but otherwise denied any political,
economic, social or cultural development. Until colonial policy dramatically
shifted in 1947, it appeared that the British intended to prepare the South
for independence as a separate state.
The
independence movement was pioneered and championed by the North, supported
by
Egypt
. The cause was reluctantly supported by the South, which stipulated
federalism and guarantees for the region as conditions for endorsing
independence. The South opted for independence on the basis of Northern
reassurances that their concerns would be given ‘serious consideration’.
However, the North quickly reneged on promises to Southerners and stepped
into the British colonial shoes. As internal colonizers, Northern
governments sought to impose Arabisation/Islamisation as the basis of a
unified homogeneous
Sudan
.
Southern
opposition to impending Arab domination began in August 1955, six months
before independence, when a battalion of Southern soldiers in the town of
Torit
mutinied and fled with their weapons. Their protest escalated into a
rebellion which resulted in a civil war that was to rage intermittently for
over half a century,starting as Anyanya I, which lead to another war,
Anyanya II.
The
initial conflict, secessionist in its objective, lasted until 1972 and ended
in a compromise – the Addis Ababa Agreement - that granted the South
limited regional autonomy and ushered in a precarious decade of peace.Its
subsequent unilateral abrogation by the government led by Gaafer Nimeiri –
the military strongman who ironically had made the peace agreement possible
in the first place – led to the resumption of hostilities in 1983.
Southerners
were incensed by Nimeiri’s embracing of Islamism, his redrawing of
North-South borders to incorporate southern oilfields and plans to construct
the mammoth
Jonglei
Canal
to divert the waters of the Sudd ( the
White Nile
’s vast floodplain) and channel its waters northwards for irrigation.
Garang’s
Vision
In
1983 Dr. John Garang de Mabior founded the Southern-based Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement and Army. The Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)’s
stated objective was not the secession of the South but the creation of a
restructured New Sudan, in which there would be no discrimination on the
basis of race, ethnicity, culture, religion or gender.
Garang’s
vision of the New Sudan was initially not understood, far less supported, in
the North and the South and even within his movement. For Southerners, who
overwhelmingly preffered separation, it was incongruent with their
aspirations, and in any case was utopian. For the North, it was arrogant
and, at best, naive. The fighting men and women in the South took it as a
clever ploy to allay the fears of those opposed to separation within
Sudan
, the international community and the Organisation of African Unity (later
the African Union). Their attitude was reflected in the Dinka saying popular
among fighters: ‘Ke tharku, angicku’, ‘What we are fighting for, we
know’.While Garang was talking the language of a united
Sudan
, they were fighting for secession.
Central
to Garang’s philosophy was the conviction that the dichotomy between the
Arab-Islamic North and the African South is largely fictional. While the
North has been labeled Arab, even those who can trace their genealogy to
Arab origins are a hybrid of Arab and African races and their culture is an
Afro-Arab mix. Significant portions of the country in the Nuba and Ingassana
or Funj areas bordering the South are as African as any further south in the
continent. The Beja in the Eastern part of the country are also indigenously
Sudanese. The Fur and several other ethnic groups in
Darfur
to the far West are black Africans. In the Darfur conflict black African
muslim pastoralists are being ‘ethnically cleansed’ and pushed off their
lands to make way for Arab muslim nomads, thus continuing the age-old march
southwards by Arabs, pushing Africans further southwards, which takes place
with the tacit approval of the Arab League. In most cases, non-Arab pockets
in the North, though predominantly adherents of Africanised Islam, have been
almost as maginalised as the people of the South. The vision of the New
Sudan therefore promised to liberate all these people and to create a
country of genuine pluralism and equality, with a greater influence for the
previously maginalised African groups.
Over
time Garang’s constructive approach neutralized those opposed to secession
in the North, Africa and the world, and rallied support for justice in a
reconstructed united
Sudan
. Garang incrementally challenged the whole country with the prospects of a
nation enriched, rather than ravished, by its racial, ethnic, religious and
cultural diversity. His dream began to appeal to those non-Arab groups that
had been subsumed under the Arab-Islamic umbrella and eventually, even to
northern liberals as many began to question their assumed ‘Arab’
identity. This national identity ‘renaissance’ began to challenge the
dominant Arab-Islamic establishment. The reaction of the establishment
throughout the 1990s was to adopt a radical offensive posture that fuelled
Islamic fundamentalism and led to a sharp deterioration in
Sudan
’s relations with the international community. Islam, rather than Arab
race or culture, was their only weapon for mobilizing the Northern majority.
Addis Ababa
and CPA
The
Addis Ababa Agreement gave Southerners a corner of the country within which
to exercise a limited degree of autonomy while major national and
international issues were left to be determined by the centre. The agreement
didn’t not provide the South with a financial base and Southern ministers
remained dependent on the goodwill of central government and President
Nimeiri for revenues.
However,
the agreement was significant in that it gave interim recognition to
Sudan
’s ethnic, cultural and religious diversity while opening channels of
interaction and mutual influence that would, over time, allow for the
evolution of an integrative national unity. That identity would no longer
emphasis the divisive elements but would instead highlight that which,
though unrecognized, is in common, as the basis for mutual self-
identification as Sudanese. In many ways, the Addis Abba Agreement was a
major achievement but also a phase of a work in progress. Its main
shortcoming was the asymmetrical relationship between the North and the
South which would have facilitated gradual assimilation for the South by the
North rather than equitable integration that would make diversity a source
of enrichment.
On
9 January, 2005, the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM/A signed the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement(CPA), by virtue of which President Omar Hassan
Bashir’s National Party would have 52 per cent of all executive and
legislative posts, while the SPLM would have 28 per cent. The remaining 20
per cent will be split among other political parties in
Sudan
, with those in the North getting 14 per cent and those in the South 6 per
cent. The CPA commits the Sudanese Government to confining Shari’a Law to
the North. It also grants South Sudan a six year period of administrative
autonomy after which the population can decide in a referendum whether to
stay in a united
Sudan
or secede. The CPA has brought peace between the North and the South and the
neighboring regions of the
Nuba
Mountains
and
Southern Blue Nile
. The CPA gives the South the right to secede through a referendum to be
exercised after a six-year interim period and stipulates that unity be made
an attractive option during the interim period. It also offers the
Nuba
Mountains
and
Southern Blue Nile
significant regional autonomy. To a significant extent, the CPA ensured a
more symmetrical or equitable relation between the North and the South than
was available under the Addis Ababa Agreement.
The
South now has its own government. The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) is
fully independent of northern interference, has its own army, its own
resource base, access to oil revenues and control of its own branch of the
National Bank, which, unlike its northern counterpart, will adhere to
conventional – rather than Islamic – banking principles.
Sudan
is to have a national foreign policy which will allow the South to develop
bilateral relations with international trade and development partners. In
the Government of National Unity announced in September 2005, the SPLM and
other southern representatives have ministerial power within an arrangement
set out in the CPA, which gives the ruling National Congress Party 52% of
the places, the SPLM 28%, other northern parties 14% and other southern
parties 6%. In order to maintain agreed quotas and reflect
Sudan
’s ethnic and political balance, several ministries will be represented by
a minister and a state minister
Garang’s
death
This
complex framework, being an agreement between only two parties, the SPLM and
the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and which continues to lack broader
support throughout the country, particularly in the North, has been
threatened by Garang’s sudden death in a helicopter crash on 30th
July 2005. He had led the SPLM/A for 22 years and, together with First
Vice-President of Sudan, Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, had been pivotal in the
negotiations that led to the CPA. He had been sworn in as First
Vice-President of Sudan and President of South Sudan previously. His death
sent shock waves throughout the
Sudan
and devastated the millions of southerners who saw him as a redeemer.
The
SPLM/A acted promptly by electing Garang’s deputy, Salva Kiir Mayardit,
(formerly Deputy Army Commander ) to succeed him as Chairman of the SPLM,
Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA and President of Southern Sudan. In the sprit
of the CPA, President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir endorsed Salva Kiir as the First
Vice-President of the Republic. While leaders in the North and South
committed themselves to pursuing Garang’s vision of a New Sudan, many fear
that Garang’s death has left a vacuum.
Sudan
has been deprived of a man poised to address the country’s myriad crises,
to bring to the East and
Darfur
the skills to facilitate peace and reconciliation he had displayed in the
South.
Under
the CPA the ruling Congress Party has the capacity to implement the
Agreement but lacks the political will, whereas the SPLM has the commitment
but is weak and disorganized. There is a real risk of future conflict unless
the Congress Party implements the CPA in good faith ant the SPLM becomes a
stronger and more effective implementing partner. Late off the starting
blocks and with a weak organizational structure, the SPLM has been
overwhelmed and ineffectual in ensuring the Congress Parties’ CPA
compliance, due to what some analysts have called its incomplete
metamorphosis from a liberation movement to a Government. This makes
uncertain future projections as to peace.
Given
the fact that this is a peace accord between opposite poles of an acutely
divided country, it remains to be seen whether this much-needed peace will
be sustainable. Several other regions of the country – foremost among them
Darfur
in the West – are challenging the Arab centre. Though Muslim and Arabised
in varying degrees, they now see themselves as non-Arab, marginalized and
discriminated against on racial grounds. While maginalised groups in
Kordofan, including those who have been generally labeled as ‘Arab’
though reflecting strong African features and cultural characteristics,
still identify with the Arab centre, dissident voices are complaining about
their marginalization. Even the Nubians of the North, in recent generations
close to
Egypt
and the Arab world, are reviving their pride in their ancient Nubian
civilization and disavowing the Arab label.
Sudan
poised at critical juncture
The
forces favouring unity within the
Sudan
, and in the region and the international community, hope that unity will be
made attractive to the South during the interim period. As the non-Arab
peripheries challenge the status quo, the country is called upon to
transform itself and start constructing an inclusive framework of national
identity in which all Sudanese would find a sense of belonging as equal
citizens. The choice for the Arab centre is to play a positive role in the
equitable reconstruction of the country. Given the genocidal nature of
identity conflicts, the international community will continue to be needed
not only to fill the vacuum of national responsibility and to provide
humanitarian assistance and protection to the civilian population but also
to promote the cause of a just and comprehensive peace, the only credible
and viable means of preventing war.
The
millions of people who acclaimed Garang on his triumphant return to
Khartoum
to be sworn in as First Vice-President were not only Southerners but people
from around the country. Garang’s vision had captured the imagination of
the nation and had become a spectacular success. Even opponents grudgingly
went along with the waves of change. If there had been a free and fair
election at that moment, Garang would have been elected President of Sudan.
This lesson was not lost by the ruling Congress Party
Garang
rasied the South and the
Sudan
as a whole to heights previously never conceived. Will those to whom he has
passed the baton – Northerners and Southerners – allow the nation to
fall from those heights? Or will they come together and join with those who
opposed Garang to pursue this vision that will give all stakeholders their
rights, whether their preference be partition or the unity of the nation? In
six years time Southerners have the right to decide to secede or remain in a
united
Sudan
. The North and
Sudan
’s international friends have been presented with an historic opportunity
to make unity attractive to the South
Will
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement also be dishonoured by
Khartoum
?
A
closer look at the CPA and its ramifications
The
State of Sudan was arbitrarily created by colonialists without regard to the
views of the concerned communities, particularly the people of
Southern Sudan
. The way the Northern ruling elite rushed
Sudan
to independence via a unilateral declaration not based on national consensus
explains the fragility of nation building in
Sudan
. Since independence in 1957,
Sudan
has been at war with itself. Major conflicts (1955-1972 and 1982-2005) have
led to the deaths of over two million people and massive displacement. Lack
of consensus about root causes of the recurrent internal wars is largely why
many peace agreements have been dishonoured or not sustained. While Northern
Sudanese, particularly the ruling elite, perceive civil war as a southern
problem caused by sinister international interference, most Southerners see
the causes as rooted in ethnicity and religion.
Urban
bias and highly centralized regimes favouring populations living around the
capital city and central
Sudan
are a legacy of colonialism. While the British sought to modernize the
economy and build infrastructures in the North, they entrusted Christian
missionaries to provide moral guidance in the South, an attribute judged to
be needed more than economic development. The socio-economic disparity
created by lack of rural development during colonial rule widened after
independence. Profound socio-economic disparity generated the sense of
frustration and injustice that eventually led people in the South to resort
to armed struggle.
Popular
perceptions about the CPA are positive. A series of focus group interviews
conducted towards the end of 2004 by the National Democratic Institute and
the New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation indicated overwhelming
support for the CPA and confidence that the SPLM has negotiated a fair deal.
However, those who took part are concerned about the future of the peace as
the SPLM has not decisively won the war. All Southern Sudanese are aware of
how previous peace agreements ( Addis Ababa, 1972 and Khartoum 1992) were
unilaterally abrogated by the central government in
Khartoum
. The precarious state of peace was summarized by a war widow who noted
during a discussion that: ‘This peace of ours is like a sick man in the
hospital. You don’t want to say for sure that he is going to be coming
home because, as long as he is in the hospital and sick, he still might
die.’
The
sustainability of peace will significantly hinge on stability in the
transitional areas of Abyei, Nuba mountains, Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan and
Darfur
, areas inhabited by the most marginalized rural Sudanese. Implementation of
the protocols for Nuba mountains and Blue Nile will be a litmus test for the
overall implementation of the CPA in the other war affected areas of the
Sudan
such as Darfur and
Eastern Sudan
.
The
most likely spoilers of the CPA are extremists frustrated that the CPA
limits their agenda to expand Islamic and Arab influence into southern
Sudan
and beyond. After the arrival of the SPLM advance team in
Khartoum
for the first time in mid-2005, a group calling themselves the Legal
Association of Muslims Scholars issued a fatwa labeling the SPLM and its
supporters as infidels and called for jihad against their ideology of
secularism.
CPA
strengths.
It
took almost ten years to conclude the CPA, making it one of the longest and
most meticulously negotiated peace agreements. Unlike previous peace
agreements in the
Sudan
it was signed only after war-weary protagonists were convinced that military
victory was not achievable. As such, the parties to the conflict concluded
the CPA on a basis of parity, each recognizing the political and military
strength of the other side. Despite the unpopularity of the National
Congress Party it was bold enough – unlike other northern political
parties – to take the courageous political decision to accept
Southern Sudan
’s right to self-determination. The parity nature of the CPA is one of the
inherent mechanisms that will undoubtedly contribute to the CPA’s full
implementation.
The
CPA is also different from previous agreements as it:-
-provides
for devolution of government functions and powers – and fiscal revenue
decentralization – to allow people at appropriate levels to manage and
direct their own affairs.
-makes
provision for a Bill of Rights, now enshrined in the new Interim National
Constitution, which obliges all levels of government to respect, uphold and
promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.
-gives
the people of southern Sudan their first opportunity to exercise the right
of self-determination – a framework for ensuring that
the unity of the Sudan is based on the free will of its people.
-has
detailed implementation modalities (the‘Global Matrix’) with measurable
and scheduled mechanisms for effective monitoring.
-allows
for the development of solid constitutional institutions.
-contains
an agreement to create a new National Armed Forces consisting of the Sudan
Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) as a
separate, regular and non-partisan armed force with a mission to defend
constitutional order.
-
has detailed arrangements for revenue transfers, the lack of which was a key
reason behind the collapse of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. The fact that
the Government of Southern Sudan has been allocated 50% of net oil revenues
generated from oil fields in
Southern Sudan
provides the key economic guarantee for effective implementation of the CPA.
-has
a large body of institutional and national witnesses and defenders - the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union, the
European Union, the League of Arab States, the UN,
Kenya
,
Uganda
,
Italy
, the
Netherlands
, the
UK
and the
USA
have formally committed themselves to playing a part in making peace a
reality.
-
has provided the international community with a major role within the
Independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission: the Commission’s main
function will be to carry out a mid-term evaluation of how the CPA is being
implemented.
International
commitment to rebuilding
Sudan
was confirmed by donor generosity during
the Oslo Conference in April 2005. The $4.53bn they pledged actually
exceeds the external humanitarian, recovery and development needs assessed
by the Sudan Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) – but is slightly less if
non-JAM programmes such as Demobilsation, Disarmament and Reintegration (
DDR
) and UN peace-keeping operations are taken into account. If realized, these
pledges will undoubtedly contribute to sustaining peace, development,
eradication of extreme poverty and hunger and attainment of the Millennium
Development Goals.
Likely
repercussions of the death of John Garang
For
many rural marginalized Sudanese, Dr. John Garang, the SPLM founder and
leader, was seen as their saviour and liberator, a beacon of their struggle
and aspirations. Descriptions recorded during focus group interviews
included: ‘He is like Jesus Christ’,
‘We consider Garang to be like Moses, who took his people away from
Egypt
’, ‘If John Garang could be cloned 100 times, things would be great.’
Dr. John Garang was undoubtedly the only person who could articulate and
reconcile the overwhelming desire for the South to peacefully secede, with
his vision of giving unity a chance during the six-year Interim Period. If
his tragic death encourages anti-New
Sudan
elements within the SPLM to speak out in favour of secession, the process of
self-determination could be endangered. The new leaders of the SPLM may find
it difficult to make the vision of the New Sudan appealing to the people of
Southern Sudan
.
The
CPA should be acknowledged as a major achievement both for
Sudan
and for
Africa
. It offers a mechanism to resolve complex issues of diversity and identity
and to set a new basis for consensual national unity based on the free will
of the people. Those who worked so hard to achieve the CPA have attempted to
meet most expectations and have given the people of rural
Sudan
a chance to be active participants in public affairs and decision making.
Because
of its organic and external mechanisms, the CPA stands a better chance than
any other previous peace agreement. Any dishonouring of its provisions would
be tantamount to constitutional disorder and might force the people of
Southern Sudan
to unilaterally declare their independence. It is to be hoped that the CPA
will survive the untimely death of the SPLM leader.
Will
war return to
South Sudan
?
The
First Vice President and the President of the government of South Sudan
Salva Kiir Mayardit has warned of a possibility of war returning to
the South and links this to the ongoing
Darfur
crisis. The matter is not only Darfur, but is the root cause of the
Sudan
conflict being honestly addressed? When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) was signed on
9th January 2005
, Sudanese hope for peace was restored. Celebrations broke out all over the
Sudan
.
When
the late Dr. John Garang de Mabior arrived in
Khartoum
on 8th July 2005 there was a heroes welcome. But peace is not a
condition that can be achieved by signing agreements at conference tables
but rather peace is a process that has to involve the entire society. The
root causes of the conflict need to be analysed in order to prescribe a
solution that is acceptable to all.
The
Sudanese believe that the CPA was the first step towards the momentous task
of building a sustainable peace in
Sudan
, it sets out the framework for a just and lasting peace by bringing in a
new political dispensation based upon the values of justice, democracy and
human rights for all Sudanese. But the following root causes of the conflict
are yet to be removed, if peace is to prevail :-.
Northern
Elite domination:
The
Sudanese speak of a colonial legacy that entrenched Northerners in the State
apparatus while Southerners had no voice in the running of the country. Now
Southerners have a say in the government and participate.
The
following facts need to be taken seriously, addressed and challenged if
peace is to come to
Sudan
:-
Umma
Party:
1.
Sayed Sadiq El Mahdi, the Umma Party leader, had as early as 1966 stated
that the failure of Islam in
Southern Sudan
would be the failure of Sudanese Muslims to be actors in international
Islamic history. Islam has a holy mission in Africa and
Southern Sudan
is the beginning of that mission.
National
Islamic Front( NIF):
2.
The National Islamic Charter in its objectives for the whole of
Sudan
affirms that Muslims are the majority in
Sudan
. It does not tolerate secularism neither does it accept it politically.
National
Congress Party( NCP):
3.The
National Congress Party (NCP), a partner to the Sudanese Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A} and signatory to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA), is intent on establishing a theocratic state in Sudan – creating a
nation that is Arab and Islamic in identity and culture which contradicts
Chapter one, Item one of the Interim National Constitution of the Republic
of the Sudan. ‘It is a democratic decentralized, multi-cultural,
multi-lingual, multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-religious country’.
Any
short comings in addressing the above and the
Sudan
might return to war again.
CPA
= One Sudan, two systems
Secularism
as the basis for maintaining the unity of the country should have been the
best choice for the Sudanese political leaders. But taking into
consideration the fear of Islamic fundamentalist parties in the North, the
CPA provided a 6 year trial period for a two systems; one country governance
arrangement. This was to give a chance to the
Khartoum
government to rescue the Islamic parties (UMMA, NCP, NIF, etc) from
abandoning their Islamic agenda for the Muslims in the Northern Sudan and to
make unity attractive between Arabs and Africans in
Sudan
, if they were serious about the unity of
Sudan
. This would be an achievement for the Arab Islamic leaders and parties who
prefer to be ruled by Shari’a ( Islamic Law ) in the North and maintain a
secular system for non-Muslims in the national capital
Khartoum
. That means that the Government of National Unity (GoNU) becomes an Islamic
and non-Islamic government. Omer Al Bashir, being the President of Sudan
becomes the father of Sudanese people. Playing his role as a father to
non-Muslims and Muslims. Omer Bashir decided to be only the father of the
Arab groups in
Sudan
and his party is pursuing an Arab Islamic agenda. It is difficult for them
to discard Islamic Shari’a; likewise it is difficult for Christians to
discard Christianity and the non-religious to discard secularism.
The
international relations of the
Sudan
state
The
Islamist parties in government, previously the NIF of Dr Hassan Abdalla El
Turabi and today the NCP of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, have adopted a
political survival strategy by fomenting conflict and instability in
neighbouring countries, actively supporting Islamic and dissident groups
fighting the governments of neighbouring countries, such as Tchad and the
Central African Republic
. The objective of this strategy is first and foremost to destabalise and
then, where possible, assist in the overthrow of the regimes in order to
pave the way for the take over of the state by Islamic groups in those
countries.
The
expansionist and political survival strategies, mediated by the export of a
brand of Islamic fundamentalism utilizes subtle means including terrorism,
drug trafficking and corruption and aims to create a halo of satellite
regimes around Khartoum as the centre of fresh Arab conquest and
colonization in Africa.It was Turabi who said in Febuary 1999 ‘we want to
islamise America and Arabise Africa’.
Sudan
is to be a springboard into the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes Region etc.
The
tactics of this expansion reveal a remarkable resemblance to those of the
seventh century. These include inter alia, scorched earth policy and ethnic
cleansing against the African people, formerly in
South Sudan
, today in the Darfur Region of Sudan. This war is characterized by pillage,
plunder and the enslavement of the conquered African peoples, with their
conversion to Islam, bringing to mind the seventh
century Arab wars of conquest in
North Africa
and other parts of the world.
The
current petroleum revenues coming mainly from oil extraction in
South Sudan
are used to finance the internal and external wars of the NCP.
Sudan
under the NCP acts in concert with its partners in the Arab League and in
time of stress is able to count on Arab support. Without doubt Sudan’s
domestic and international policies are harmonious with general Arab League
strategies in the Middle East ( Sudan in December 2006 provided a large cash
gift to the Palestinian Hamas organization, by way of solidarity, in the
face of Israel’s refusal to allow money into the Palestinian economy ),
Africa and elsewhere.
Sudan
sets itself up as a front for a fresh wave of Arab conquest and the
Arabisation of Black Africa.
Arabs
in general look down with contempt on African people as an inferior race,
deserving enslavement.This is also seen in
Mauritania
. Thus being a Muslim is not a sufficient criteria to save an African from
scorn and contempt, as the Black muslims of
Darfur
have found out. This is exacerbated by the conviction among many Arab
thinkers and writers that Africans do not have a culture of their own,
leaving a vacuum after decolonization which must be filled by Islamic and
Arab culture. Consequently many Arabs believe that Africans do not have
rights to self-determination.
The
conflict in
Sudan
receives wide and close hearing in Arab forums, such as the Arab League.
Whereas the South Sudan situation was never raised or placed on the agenda
of the OAU, the Arabs, lead by Egypt, tenaciously resisted the inclusion of
the conflict in the various OAU summits and Ministerial meetings, on the
basis that South Sudan was an internal affair of the Arab League.
Even
so Africa has, since the time of Nasser’s
Egypt
, supported the Palestinians versus Isreal. This has not been reciprocated
by the Arab north African states. Worse still, Africa in general is either
ignorant of the Sudan situation, or does not wish to support fellow Africans
in Sudan, due to a wish not to offend Arabia, because of an inadequate sense
of African national solidarity. Pan-Africanism requirees that the African
Diaspora engage the
Sudan
issue, even if Black Africa does not.
If
the Islamic parties in the North were to be real believers and nationalists,
or strugglers for mankind’s freedom and happiness, self-determination for
the African Sudanese ought to be the easiest option for the Arab Islamic
parties and NCP in the north. They could have been the parties, which allow
the Africans to secede from the Arab Islamic north, so that the south, east
and west could enjoy its African culture without hindrance of the Arab
Islamic north.
Happily
the Arab Islamic parties and regime in
Sudan
are co-operating with the implementation of the CPA. The fact is that the
Egyptian government has spent all its post-colonial history suppressing and
marginalizing Sudanese people, especially African tribes in
Sudan
. The Egyptian government is emotionally attached to maintaining
Sudan
’s unity at the expense of
Sudan
’s peace and development. The Egyptian government would not wish to be
known as the one, which is the source of Sudanese conflict and would not
allow the South to exercise its free choice as to its future.
The
idea of ‘two systems, one government’ is to test the Arab Islamic
parties and Government on whether they can end a historical era in Sudan
filled with religious conflicts, racism, wars, and to build the ‘New
Sudan’ aiming at coexistence and prosperity between Christianity, Islam
and traditional groups in Sudan, and without which there can be no united
Sudan nor united Africa.
The
Arab Islamic parties know that after a transitional period of six years
before self determination is exercised, their will is to be tested in the
Government of National Unity (GoNU) operating the arrangement ‘two
systems, one country’ which is currently running. Two years have gone and
the time is approaching for the South to decide whether to unite with the
Arabs or separate. If the Arabs make unity attractive and Arab Islamic
leaders, parties and government want to build a nation called the ‘New
Sudan ‘, where people are united by love and goodwill, the African
Sudanese will decide to vote to remain in the union. At which time the
system of government in the interim agreed upon in the CPA would become the
accepted system for the whole of
Sudan
.
If
the African South chooses to secede, then the Arab Islamic North could adopt
any political system that it chooses. The South accepted in the CPA to allow
the option of unity within a ‘two systems one country’ mandate as a test
for Arab Islamic leaders and parties to show their willingness to survive in
love and as equals with African Sudanese in the South, East and West of
Sudan.
William
Deng Nhial was assassinated for developing the idea that the ‘majority
African Sudanese’ in
Sudan
are being oppressed and marginalized by the minority Arab tribes in
Khartoum
. The majority African Sudanese are able to rule in a united democratic
Sudan
, but this should be done through a democratic system which the Islamic
fundamentalist are afraid of. They thus introduced Islamic Shari’a law
with the hope of dividing African Muslims from African Christians in
Sudan
and thus obtain a religious majority.
This
policy was practiced during the Ottoman Empire, by Mohamed Ali in 1820 and
the Madhya including the present Islamic parties in
Northern Sudan
. As a divide and rule system, it worked in marginalizing African tribes in
Sudan
and to develop the Arab tribes both educationally and economically thus
creating the current wars. It succeeded in preventing African Sudanese from
educating themselves, promoting literacy and eliminating poverty and
dependency in the South, East and West of Sudan.
In
1966 William Deng Nhial came to
Sudan
and volunteered to work for peace under the slogan of ‘
Sudan
for Sudanese’ and recommended ‘two systems, one
Sudan
’. But the ‘Pan Arabism’ promoted by Gamal Abdel Nasir then worked to
ensure that William Deng Nhial was eliminated, because William Deng’s idea
of ‘Sudan’s African national unity’ was against the Egyptian
government policy of making Africa united under Arabism and Islam. To them,
William Deng Nhial was a dangerous African raising awareness in the
Sudan
for the liberation, justice and holistic progress of Africans. To the
Egyptian government at that time William Deng Nhial and his party the
‘Sudan African National Union’(SANU) would undermine the ‘Arab
Nationalist’ movement who stood for the Arabisation and Islamisation of
the whole African continent and beyond.
To
achieve this goal
Egypt
initiated various activities in
Sudan
, one of which was to eliminate African leaders like William Deng Nhial, and
even weaken the UMMA party at that time, which was cooperating with the SANU
under the slogan ‘
Sudan
for Sudanese.’ The Egyptian government decided to keep African people
fighting themselves, so African Sudanese would have no chance to educate
themselves and develop economically to compete with the Arab groups. Instead
Africans would remain beggars in their own continent
Africa
and also in the Arab world, by keeping African Sudanese controlled by
poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance. Pan-Arabism in Sudan was convinced
that the Arab ethnic groups in the North are Arabs and Muslims and therefore
they are their brothers.The Arab policy was that Arab groups in Sudan should
not give African ethnic groups in Sudan the chance for stability and
uniting, which is the source of power and that African ethnic groups must be
kept far away from power, kept ignorant, and poor.
This
was one of the main reasons for the start of the war in the Southern Sudan
at Torit in 1955 when the Number II Company of the
Sudan
army mutinied. The commander who started the shoot-out was said to be an
Egyptian military officer called Salah planted in the Sudanese
army.Egyptian’s intentions are very clear; the Egyptian government wants
to keep the South blinded and prevented from seeing freedom and happiness by
force and the use of the Arab-Islamic government in Khartoum.
Egypt
used Pan Arabism and it’s party in
Sudan
which was than headed by Ismail Al Azhari, supported by some members of the
‘Southern Front’ at that time. They created obstacles for the African
ethnic groups in
Sudan
to achieving their right to self-determination. They also played a part in
the assassination of William Deng Nhial. All these Egyptian activities in
Sudan
cannot be easily forgotten, but the South may forgive
Egypt
if
Egypt
and its friends in the Arab world accept to pay reparations for the slavery
they introduced into
Sudan
and the loss of lives in the war and retarded development since 1955.
Egyptian
fear of Arab-Islamic fundamentalismt is a deception. Arab-Islamic
fundamentalism started in
Egypt
because of its policies and lack of democracy.
Egypt
points fingers at Arab-Islamic fundamentalism now because of its connection
with terrorism in order to hoodwink governments, which are committed to
eliminating terrorism, and finding a peaceful solution to the conflicts in
Palestine
and
Israel
.
Egypt
is opposed to peace in the ‘Middle East’ and is opposed to peace in
Sudan
because the Egyptian government keeps nations fighting, weak and poor.
Sudan
must be kept fighting itself and suffering so that
Egypt
is protected by the death of the African ethnic groups and the margnalised
people in
Sudan
.
To
the Egyptian government;
Sudan
,
Ethiopia
,
Uganda
, and
Kenya
, who are sharing the sweet water of the White and Blue Niles should be kept
fighting themselves and under developed. Development in these neighbouring
states means less water for
Egypt
’s survival. The Egyptian government’s fear of Israel coming to an
independent African State in Sudan to assist in its development, is an
unfounded fear that the African ethnic groups might be helped to become
powerful, happy and enjoy progress in Africa, yet the Egyptian government
and Israel are enjoying a cordial relationship and are peacefully
coexisting.
What
well intentioned bystanders should do is to :-
-Encourage
African and Arab ethnic groups in Sudan to abandon racial and ethnic
conflicts and instead deal with the common issues of all marginalized
African groups in Sudan and in Africa including, natural resources, the
environment, security, the establishment of better welfare programs and the
like.
-Encourage
cooperation between the Sudanese political parties and religious groups to
work for liberation, justice and peace in
Sudan
regardless of race, colour, religion or political affiliation.
-Encourage
the development of a true relationship based on ‘friendship and
brotherhood’ between Christianity and Islam in
Sudan
, because the two are important for the guarantee of ’freedom, harmony,
justice, peace and holistic progress’ in
Sudan
.
-There
should be no fear for any Sudanese political parties, including the Islamic
government in Khartoum to fully accept and cooperate with the United
Nations, OAU, IGAD, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for the
realization of not only ‘Sudan Peace’ and true ‘Happiness’, but also
to help Sudan and Africa achieve stability, which is necessary for fighting
poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance and even greed; assisting NCP’s
government to eliminate its concept of racialism based on selfishness and
greed which is becoming a new disease in Sudan.
-Encourage
international and local non-governmental organizations to help
Sudan
and Africa organize projects that will help liberate the people of
Africa
, that have been kept backward and ignorant for so long, to liberate
themselves from disease, sickness and pain.
Apparently
the Founding Fathers of the OAU, or at least some of them, did not know the
real nature of Afro-Arab interaction in the Afro-Arab Borderlands, and were
ignorant of the grassroots conflictual relations which exploded into
violence in Nouakchott, Mauritania for the first time in 1966 (
Diallo,1993). As the movement, which was largely driven by
Libya
, gained momentum towards the revision of the OAU structures, some observers
monitored closely the formulation of the Charter of the emerging African
Union (AU). This was not easy, given that the elaboration took place, at
least in the early stages, away from public scrutiny and knowledge. From the
‘Report of the meeting of Legal Experts and Parliamentarians on the
establishment of the African Union and the Pan-African Parliament’ dated
17-20 April 2000, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Ref Cab/Leg/23.15/6/Vol IV,
paragraph 48, under the rubic ‘ Consideration Protocol relating to the
Pan-African Parliament’ at the section referring to article 4 ‘
Objectives’, it is stated :-
‘ On the issue of composition it was proposed that the prospective
members should represent
not only the people of
Africa
and those who have naturalized, but peoples of African descent as
well. However, other delegations were of the view that only African
people should be
represented in the Parliament…..’
At
paragraph 55 appearing under the same rubic as paragraph 48 ( ie
Consideration Protocol relating to the Pan-African Parliament ) in the
section referring to Articles 2 and 3 ‘ Establisment and relationship with
the OAU’, it is reported…
‘After effecting certain amendments to paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Article 3, the reference to members of Parliament representing all people of
‘ African descent’ was deleted’
It
is no secret that Arabia in the OAU never saw a place for the African
Diaspora in its deliberations, whereas Africans in general embrace their ‘
kith and kin’ taken out of
Africa
through slavery. Mohamed Fayek, Director-General, Dar Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi,
Cairo, Egypt in his contribution to the Amman Seminar on Afro-Arab relations
points out that prior to the Nasserite Revolution of
July 23, 19
52 Egypt had no organic relationship with the rest of Africa and there
existed no linkage movements. He goes on
to state that:-
‘…The African movement itself, which was initiated by black
Americans in reaction to discrimination against them, adopted the theme of
the black man’s dignity and freedom and his returning
to his roots – while the black Americans had neither knowledge nor
concrete links with the African continent, other than the colour of their
skin. Hence the birth of what is called ‘Africanism’ based on their
African descent – but only with black
Africa
in mind. African unity was to them as much a way of reviving the ancient
African empires of Ghana, Songhai, Mali and others, as it was the unity of
black Africa. With this, Africanism, before reaching the African continent
itself, took a separate path from Arab Africa.
Egypt
, therefore, as well as the rest of
North Africa
, had no connection with this particular African movement’.
Conclusions
The
war has become circular,(i.e.
it can best be described in
terms of the margin vs. the centre). If there is any peace to be brokered,
it should be inclusive in respect of all marginalized groups fighting
alongside the SPLM/SPLA. However, the Naivasha peace initiative, which was
brokered mainly by
America
and
Britain
, is concerned only with the civil war in the South. Like the rest of the
West,
America
and
Britain
have persistently decided to deal with the civil war in
Sudan
as between the African and Christian South against the Muslim Arab North.
It
does not make sense in deciding to put an end to the war in the South and
leave it to flare up in the Ingassana, Darfur,
Nuba
Mountains
or Beja, especially when the causes of the war are the same and the fighting
groups have achieved a kind of unifying body. What is the wisdom behind
telling the other parties to wait until the fight in the South comes to an
end? It is like telling them to keep on fighting until you reach a deal with
the biggest fighting group. Whereas the war is
a circular one, the Naivasha peace initiative and its CPA is
unfortunately a linear solution.
Two
areas in Africa where the issue of racism has been addressed are South(ern)
Africa and
South Sudan
. How the issue was managed in both instances provides some lessons for the
marginalized people of the Borderlands. In South Africa Western finance
capital brought about, with minimum loss of life, the timely end of
apartheid,which was no longer internationally socially sustainable as an
intensive system of capital accumulation. In South Sudan there were no such
financial interests of the international community, nor of Arabia, to end
Arab oppression of Southern Sudanese Africans, who consequently had to fight
Khartoum
for 25-50 years in a bloody war in which over two million lost their lives.
In
Darfur
there will be no end to the genocide of Africans, except if the end of the
killings is brought about by Africans. Problems such as
Mauritania
and
Darfur
, with long historical antecedents, will not be resolved by the Americans,
the Europeans, the Chinese or by the United Nations, because they have no
interest in resolving core African weaknesses.
Recommendations
People
of the margins should come together. On the civilian political level they
should have an alliance that represents their thinking. Before coordinating
or uniting their military organs they need to have their civilian
organizations united in a big alliance. The battle against the centre has
had two fronts: military and civilian. So far the people of the margins have
been faring very well on the military front, but not on the civilian side.
The two bodies (civilian and military) are not necessarily conditioned by
each other; although driving at one aim, the civilian battle, however, is
virtually different from the military battle. The alliance of the forces of
the margins is fundamental for peace or war. If it is war, then war should
be fought properly; if it is peace, then peace should be holistic and
well-guarded.
It
is no longer advisable to postpone, at least reflection, on the creation of
an organization to house the
African
Nation, defined as Africa south of the Sahara, plus the Western (
Americas
, Europe, Carribean etc ) and Eastern ( Arabia,
North Africa
,
Gulf States
and points eastwards etc ) Diasporas.To fail to address this challenge now
would be self-defeating. As pe